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ABSTRACT 
This Article discusses the legal framework for sovereign debt 
restructuring in the euro area—both de lege lata and de lege ferenda. 
Sovereign debt restructurings remain exceptional events that come 
with profound implications for financial stability and monetary policy 
transmission. However, they may become necessary as part of a 
financial assistance program to a euro area Member State, as was the 
case for Greece in 2012. This Article seeks to contribute to the ongoing 
debate on how to enhance the functioning of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (“EMU”) by exploring the legal aspects of sovereign 
debt restructuring in the euro area. This includes an analysis on 
whether and how the procedures for sovereign debt restructurings in 
the euro area can be made more orderly, fair, and predictable by 
establishing a European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework 
(“ESDRF”). Drawing upon international standards for sovereign bond 
documentation, we propose the inclusion of enhanced Collective 
Action Clauses (“CACs”), as well as certain technical amendment 
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clauses. In addition, we discuss two options for a dispute resolution 
mechanism when contractual techniques to restructure sovereign debt 
fail: (i) a specialized chamber of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”) and (ii) a sovereign debt arbitration mechanism. The 
Article makes no judgment on the economic or political feasibility and 
necessity for such changes, but seeks to shine a light on the legal 
aspects that ought to be taken into account in the context of reforming 
the euro area’s sovereign debt crisis resolution framework. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“It would be useful to think about a more predictable 
and transparent way of how to deal with debt 
restructurings.” 
- Klaus Regling, Managing Director of the European 
Stability Mechanism (“ESM”), October 20171 
The euro area sovereign debt crisis revealed important 
deficiencies in the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(“EMU”), notably with regard to two interlinked aspects. First, 
Member States of the European Union have engaged in lax fiscal 
policies or built up macroeconomic imbalances without having to face 
any serious sanction from the market or from the European Union.2 
Second, when the global financial crisis migrated across the Atlantic to 
 
1.  Klaus Regling, Managing Director, European Stability Mechanism, Is Europe Prepared 
for the Next Crisis? A Discussion with Klaus Regling at the European Stability Mechanism’s 
5th Anniversary, (Oct. 11, 2017), available at https://piie.com/events/europe-prepared-next-
crisis [https://perma.cc/ZN79-V6UU]. 
2.  As Lane contends, “the initial institutional design of the euro plausibly increased fiscal 
risks during the pre-crisis period.” See, e.g., Philip Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 
26 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 50, 65 (2012) (noting that “the origin and propagation of the European 
sovereign debt crisis can be attributed to the flawed original design of the euro’” and that the 
“European sovereign debt crisis . . . provides an opportunity to implement reforms that are 
necessary for a stable monetary union but that would not have been politically feasible in its 
absence”). With respect to the first deficiency, it is submitted by several commentators that 
reliance on “soft” mechanisms to ensure compliance with the debt ceiling set out in the Stability 
and Growth Pact (“SGP”). Between the years 1998 and 2012, fourteen countries violated the 
public debt rules of the SGP more than 120 times, raising serious doubts about the framework’s 
effectiveness in ensuring sound fiscal policies. See Michael A. Hansen, Explaining Deviations 
from the Stability and Growth Pact: Power, Ideology, Economic Need or Diffusion?, 35 J. PUB. 
POL’Y 477, 481, 479 n.1 (2015). 
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Europe, the EMU framework lacked fiscal instruments to address acute 
financing difficulties that arose in both the private3 and public sector.4 
Policymakers in Europe have sought to address the outlined 
problems, most of which came to the fore during the crisis, by 
significantly reshaping EMU governance and introducing various crisis 
resolution mechanisms. For instance, the establishment of a Banking 
Union5—together with the changes introduced by the Banking 
Recovery and Resolution Directive6—seeks to prevent taxpayer-
funded bailouts of banks in the future and cushion the adverse effects 
of “sovereign-bank feedback loop.”7 In addition, the European 
Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) is an international financial institution 
which functions as a lender of last-resort on the basis of an inter-
governmental treaty between the nineteen euro area governments.8 The 
total lending capacity of the ESM is EU€500 billion, which almost 
matches the total quota resources of the International Monetary Fund 
 
3.  See, e.g., HANS GEEROMS & PAWL KARBOWNIK, A MONETARY UNION REQUIRES A 
BANKING UNION (2014), available at https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-
paper/beep33.pdf?download=1. 
4.  Crucially, the infamous “sovereign-bank feedback loop” rendered it close to impossible 
to disentangle private and public balance sheets, making it difficult to resort to burden-sharing 
mechanisms to reduce debt levels in either sphere. Indeed, fears of sovereign default undermined 
confidence in the private banks that held much sovereign debt, forcing these banks to contract 
their balance sheets, driving the price of sovereign debt still lower. 
5.  See e.g., JENS-HINRICH BINDER & CHRISTOS V. GORTSOS, THE EUROPEAN 
BANKING UNION: A COMPENDIUM (2015); DANNY BUSCH & GUIDO 
FERRARINI, EUROPEAN BANKING UNION (2015); GIUSEPPE BOCCUZZI, THE EUROPEAN 
BANKING UNION: SUPERVISION AND RESOLUTION (2016); Andreas Dombret, European 
Financial Integration: Monetary Union, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, in EQUITY 
MKTS. IN TRANSITION 565–73 (2017). 
6.  Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment 
Firms and Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and 
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Text with EEA relevance, 2014 O.J. (L, 12.6.2014) 190. 
7.  See, e.g., Heather Gibson, Stephen Hall & George Tavlas, Self-fulfilling Dynamics: The 
Interactions of Sovereign Spreads, Sovereign Ratings and Bank Ratings During the Euro 
Financial Crisis, 73 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 371 (2017) (finding that sovereign ratings, 
sovereign spreads, and bank ratings strongly interacted with each other during the euro crisis, 
confirming strong doom-loop effects). 
8.  For an overview of the ESM and its legal framework, see, e.g., Christoph Ohler, The 
European Stability Mechanism: The Long Road to Financial Stability in the Euro Area, 54 
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 47 (2011). Also compare more recently Jefferey Atik, From ‘No Bailout’ 
to the European Stability Mechanism, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1201 (2015). 
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(“IMF”) of around US$645 billion.9 In addition, EMU governance and 
policy coordination was further strengthened through several new 
instruments to prevent and manage financial crises in the European 
Union.10 
However, some argue that these reforms are not sufficient to 
address situations of sovereign insolvency, i.e., when an analysis of the 
Member State’s debt sustainability yields a negative result.11 While the 
ESM may have sufficient resources to provide liquidity to a Member 
State in crisis, its funds may be rapidly depleted if the country is 
confronted with unsustainable levels of debt.12 This is because any 
crisis resolution framework that involves a lender of last resort for 
countries, such as the ESM or the IMF, is based on the premise that no 
credit can be extended to a country that will not be able to repay in the 
future.13 
With respect to the euro area, the key question therefore is 
whether the ESM framework should feature a mechanism to restructure 
sovereign bonds in cases were the country’s debt is deemed 
 
9.  ETIENNE DE LHONEUX & CHRISTOS VASSILOPOULOS, THE EUROPEAN STABILITY 
MECHANISM BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (2014). 
10.  See, e.g., for an overview of the evolution of EMU after the crisis from a legal point 
of view, Päivi Leino & Tuomas Saarenheimo, Sovereignty and Subordination: On the Limits of 
EU Economic Policy Coordination, 43(1) EUR. L. REV. 166 (2017). For an economic analysis, 
see, e.g., Heather D. Gibson, Theodore Palivos & George S. Tavlas, The Crisis in the Euro Area: 
An Analytical Overview, 39 J. MACROECONMICS 233 (2014). 
11.  One problem that is frequently cited in this context is the so-called “home bias,” which 
reflects the fact that many banks predominantly hold sovereign debt issued by their home 
country, i.e., Italian banks hold a much higher amount of Italian sovereign bonds than non-Italian 
banks. This means that sovereign risk is directly translated into credit risk for domestic financial 
institutions, exacerbating the aforementioned sovereign-bank nexus. See, e.g., Gaetano Gaballo 
& Ariel Zetlin-Jones, Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Banks’ Home Bias for Sovereign Debt, 81(c) 
J. MONETARY ECON. 70 (2016). 
12.  We do not doubt that drawing a line between a solvency and liquidity crises is 
extremely challenging and subject to enormous controversy, particularly in the context of a 
sovereign borrower. Yet, the current ambiguity undermines the confidence in and the credibility 
of the ESM lending framework. See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini, Debt Sustainability: How to Assess 
Whether a Country is Insolvent (Dec. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/papers/debtsustainability.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y3Q-
WKV2]; see also Pablo D’Erasmo, Enrique G. Mendoza & Jing Zhang, What is a Sustainable 
Public Debt?, in 2B HANDBOOK OF MACROECONOMICS 2493 (John Taylor & Harold Uhlig eds., 
2015). 
13.  See, e.g., Vincent Bignon, Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, Bagehot for Beginners: 
The Making of Lender-of-Last-Resort Operations in the Mid-nineteenth Century, 65 ECON. 
HIST. REV. 580 (2012). 
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unsustainable.14 Indeed, as the European Central Bank (“ECB”) 
mentioned in its opinion on the ESM Treaty, “[the ESM’s] framework 
should be designed in a way that minimises moral hazard and reinforces 
incentives for pre-emptive fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment.”15 
Against this backdrop, the present Article seeks to sketch out an 
improved European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework 
(“ESDRF”)16 without, however, reaching conclusions as regards the 
actual feasibility of such framework from an economic or political 
point of view. This Article draws upon other proposals by academics17 
and policymakers.18 It incorporates both voices advocating for the 
establishment of an ESDRF and such cautioning against it. 
One strand of the literature argues that an ESDRF may reinforce 
the credibility of the no-bailout clause19 ex-ante by making sovereign 
default a feasible option to remedy unsustainable public debt levels 
within the euro area,20 anchor market participants’ expectations in 
 
14.  See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, MONTHLY REPORT: APPROACHES TO RESOLVING 
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES IN THE EURO AREA, 41 (2016), 45. 
15.  European Central Bank CON/2011/24 (Opinion of the European Central Bank on a 
Draft European Council Decision Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency is 
the Euro), 2011 O.J. (C 140/05) ¶ 2, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/
pdf/c_14020110511en00080011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSR6-CRVM]. 
16.  The term ESDRF, as used in this paper, describes a framework for debt restructuring 
rather than an institution or a mechanism with a strong institutional element. 
17.  See Clemens Fuest, Friedrich `Heinemann & Christoph Schröder, A Viable Insolvency 
Procedure for Sovereigns (VIPS) in the Euro Area, ZEW DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 14-053, 1 
(2014), available at http://www.zew.de/en/publikationen/a-viable-insolvency-procedure-for-
sovereigns-vips-in-the-euro-area/?cHash=ec0bea56b1a938f2c45222a996291dcf 
[https://perma.cc/WJR9-YHGA]; see also François Gianviti, Anne O. Krueger, Jean Pisani-
Ferry, André Sapir & Jürgen von Hagen, A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Resolution: A Proposal, X BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT SERIES, 1 (2010), available at 
http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/101109_BP_as_jpf_jvh_
A_European_mechanism_for_sovereign_debt_crisis_resolution_a_proposal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9D8Y-QLN5]; COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POL. & REFORM, REVISITING 
SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY (Oct. 2013). 
18.  See Jochen Andritzky, Désirée I. Christofzik, Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, A 
Mechanism to Regulate Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area, (German Council of 
Economic Experts Working Paper, No 04, July 2016). See also André Sapir & Dirk 
Schoenmaker, The Time is Right for a European Monetary Fund, BRUEGEL POLICY BRIEF NO. 
4, Oct. 2017, available at http://bruegel.org/2017/10/the-time-is-right-for-a-european-
monetary-fund/ [https://perma.cc/MC6D-CLFN]; EUR. PARL. THINK TANK, SOVEREIGN 
DEBT RESTRUCTURING: MAIN DRIVERS AND MECHANISM (2017). 
19.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union art. 
125, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 99 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
20.  Andritzky et al., supra note 18, para. 37 at 15. 
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sovereign creditworthiness,21 and facilitate more orderly and equitable 
debt restructuring ex-post by introducing a predefined legal procedure 
to deter holdout behavior.22 Another strand focuses on the associated 
risks, arguing that if not implemented together with other reforms, an 
ESDRF could immediately weaken banks’ balance sheets, thereby 
reinforcing the so-called “sovereign-bank feedback loop”23 as well as 
negatively impact the transmission of monetary policy.24 
A recent paper by Gourinchas and Martin takes a middle ground, 
arguing that both narratives hold some truths: (official sector) bail-outs 
may avoid debt default, but the no-bailout commitment may only be 
credibly safeguarded by ensuring orderly government debt 
restructurings.25 
The present Article neither advocates that an enhanced debt 
restructuring framework provides a panacea nor that the idea should be 
dismissed without further investigation. On that basis, it endeavors to 
shine light on some of the complex and intricate legal aspects of 
sovereign debt restructurings in Europe, which have so far received 
little attention. At the same time, it is stressed that any enhancements 
to the euro area sovereign debt restructuring framework have to be 
decided on a political level by European governments and EU 
legislators.26 
 
21.  EUR. PARL. THINK TANK, supra note 18, at 11. 
22.  Gianviti et al., supra note 17, at 5. 
23.  See generally Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, Sovereign Default, 
Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions, 69 J. FIN. 819 (2014). See also Ricardo Hermitte, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms: Mind the Trap, in SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN THE 
EU (Luigi Paganetto ed., 2017); Lorenzo Forni & Massimimiliano Pisani, Macroeconomic 
Effects of Sovereign Restructuring in a Monetary Union: A Model-based Approach, (IMF, 
Working Paper WP/13/269, Dec. 2013), available at https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13269.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEJ9-SWXY]. 
24.  Note for instance that the debt restructuring may negatively affect the eligibility of 
bonds for monetary policy operations. See, e.g., European Central Bank, Decision on the 
Eligibility of Marketable Debt Instruments Issued or Fully Guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic 
in the Context of the Hellenic Republic’s Debt Exchange Offer, 2012 O.J. L 77 (Mar. 5, 2012) 
at 19. 
25.  See Pierre Olivier Gourinchas & Philippe Martin, The Economics of Sovereign Debt, 
Bailouts and the Eurozone Crisis, (May 19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/1884_MARTIN%20-
%20The%20Economics%20of%20Sovereign%20Debt,%20Bailouts%20and%20the%20Euroz
one%20Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKC4-AFBA]. 
26.  Indeed, depending on the legal basis that is chosen, an ESDRF may require a qualified 
majority among Member States, if not unanimity See infra III.C. for a discussion of the ESDRF’s 
legal basis. 
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The Article is structured as follows: Section II reviews the euro 
area’s sovereign debt crisis resolution mechanism de lege lata with a 
view to providing an understanding of the existing framework. Section 
III discusses—de lege ferenda—how the legal framework for 
restructuring of sovereign debt in the euro area could be enhanced. It 
discusses, in particular, existing proposals to enhance sovereign debt 
restructurings, the ESDRF’s potential legal basis, as well as 
institutional, procedural, and substantive aspects that ought to be taken 
into account. Section IV concludes. 
II. THE EURO AREA’S CURRENT SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
“[ . . . ] the effectiveness and potential costs of debt 
restructuring depend not only on their economic 
impact but also on the legal framework.” 
- Bénassy-Quéré et al., Group of 14 French-German 
Economists, January 2018.27 
A. The Greek Sovereign Debt Restructuring of 2012 
The start of the recent euro area debt crisis can be traced back to 
2009 when the newly elected Greek Prime Minister publicly 
announced that the country’s budget deficit will likely hit twelve 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) in 2010.28 Markets 
reacted to this bleak fiscal outlook by increasing the risk premia Greece 
had to pay on its sovereign bonds.29 In the following two years, several 
financial assistance programs were agreed with European and 
international partners to stabilize the Greek economy. Ultimately, 
however, deep debt relief proved inevitable and the so-called “Troika,” 
consisting of the IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission, made 
further financial assistance dependent upon the implementation of a 
 
27.  Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al., Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A 
Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform, CEPR POLICY INSIGHTS NO. 91, Jan. 2018, at 12, 
available at https://cepr.org/active/publications/policy_insights/viewpi.php?pino=91 [https://
perma.cc/5EYZ-Y89D]. 
28.  This led to an upward revision of the deficit projection by Eurostat from 3.7% to 
12.5%. Cf. Provision of Deficit and Debt Data for 2008 – Second Notification, EUROSTAT NEWS 
(Oct. 22, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5074630/2-22102009-AP-EN.
PDF/490aa296-ccc7-4714-91c5-b5c8ddb73948?version=1.0 [https://perma.cc/MJZ2-MK9Y]. 
29.  See Lane, supra note 2, at 56-57. 
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nominal haircut on Greek government debt.30 The Greek Private Sector 
Involvement (“PSI”) of 2012 was not only the biggest debt 
restructuring operation in history, it was also the first one to take place 
in an advanced economy.31 As the zero-risk weighting rule of euro area 
public debt, defined under the applicable EU Regulations, suggests,32 
sovereign default in an advanced European country was long 
considered impossible; indeed, some policymakers referred to a Greek 
default as “death penalty.”33 
In March 2012, Greece successfully imposed a haircut on private 
bondholders by retrofitting collective action clauses (“CACs”) to 
Greek-law bonds, as mandated in the conditions of the Second 
Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece.34 The debt relief, which 
resulted in creditor losses of more than fifty percent on average, 
reduced Greece’s debt burden by roughly EU€100 billion.35 From a 
legal point of view, debt relief was achieved by means of the Greek 
Bondholder Act (“GBA”) 2012, which enabled a majority of sixty-six 
percent or two-thirds of bondholders to bind a minority of holdouts to 
the terms and conditions of the debt swap agreed upon with the 
 
30.  The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, 6 EUR. COMM. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 94, March 2012, at 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp94_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/S74P-KYBQ]. 
31.  See Michael Tomz and Mark L.J. Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and 
Default, 5 AN. REV. ECON. 247, 257 (2013) (noting that “[t]he largest default in history (by 
present value) was the 2012 Greek restructuring that covered more than €200 billion of privately 
held debt, followed by Argentina in 2001 and Russia in 1918.”). 
32.  Regulation 575/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Regulation 
648/12, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1. For a recent criticism of this zero-risk weighting rule for euro area 
sovereign bonds, see e.g., Andreas Dombret, Executive Board Member, Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Speech at the Annual Conference on the Banking Union: The Other Side of the Coin – Why 
European Supervision Needs International Regulation (May 15, 2017), available at 
https://www.bis.org/review/r170515a.htm [https://perma.cc/FWX2-2K72]. 
33.  Ralph Atkins, Interview Transcript: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, FIN. TIMES (May 29, 
2011), https://www.ft.com/content/91f52140-89e2-11e0-beff-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/
57NT-YJH2]. 
34.  The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 30. See, e.g., 
Sebastian Grund, Restructuring Government Debt Under Local Law: The Greek Case and 
Implications for Investor Protection in Europe, 12 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 253 (2017); Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: an Autopsy, 28 
ECON. POL’Y 513 (2013). 
35.  Miranda Xava, Lessons From the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring, VOXEU, (Jun. 25, 
2014), http://voxeu.org/article/greek-debt-restructuring-lessons-learned [https://perma.cc/
3KM8-VTDE]. 
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Troika.36 While this mechanism worked smoothly for Greek-law 
bonds, holdouts blocked the restructuring of EU€6 billion in foreign-
law bonds.37 The latter type of bonds featured single-limb non-
aggregated CACs, which, in contrast to the aggregated version 
implemented through the GBA, required a majority of seventy-five 
percent in each individual series of bonds.38 
Fearing protracted litigation in foreign courts and weary of 
reputational risks, the Greek government paid these holdout funds in 
full, openly discriminating between holders of foreign and Greek-law 
bonds. Moreover, and this is a lesser-known fact, the Greek debt 
exchange offer included a minimum participation threshold, which 
stipulated that if 90% of bondholders agreed to Greece’s restructuring, 
it would be deemed successful.39 While holders of foreign-law bonds 
thus escaped a haircut, several thousands of holders of Greek-law that 
were exposed to losses challenged Greece in foreign and domestic 
courts. Remarkably, litigation in respect of domestic-law bonds is still 
ongoing roughly six years after the debt operation was concluded.40 It 
is now widely agreed that the first and only debt restructuring in the 
euro area revealed significant inefficiencies in the euro area’s crisis 
resolution framework, prompting a set of reforms aimed at making the 
currency area more resilient to future sovereign debt distress.41 
 
36.  Notably, the retrofitted CAC was fully aggregated, which means that bondholders 
voted not in each individual series but their votes were aggregated across the entire outstanding 
stock of Greek debt. See Press Release, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, (March 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.pdma.gr/attachments/article/80/9%20MARCH%202012%20-%20
RESULTS.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEB8-NJ6R]. 
37.   Lee Buchheit, The Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012, in ESCB LEGAL CONFERENCE 
(Oct. 2016), at 46, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference
2016_201702.en.pdf?e2dea3a78485afe4c70d5d5010f368be [https://perma.cc/2NBZ-E4NT]. 
38.  Hence, holdouts may acquire blocking positions in smaller series, thereby thwarting 
the entire debt swap. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller & Brad Setser, Count the Limbs: 
Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds, GEO L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS & 
OTHER WORKS 1793 (2015). 
39.  “Minimum participation thresholds” condition the exchange to a critical level of 
creditor participation, meaning that a debt restructuring will not be successful if a certain 
percentage of bondholders does not take part in the deal. They have to be differentiated from 
CACs, however. CACs enable ensure financial democracy, while minimum participation 
thresholds are coordinating devices. See, e.g., Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon, and Jeromin 
Zettelmeyer, The Problem that Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings, 64 INT’L. MON. FUND ECON. REV. 471 (2016). 
40.  See, e.g., Grund, supra note 34 (reviewing litigation with regard to domestic law bonds 
after the Greek PSI in different municipal courts across Europe). 
41.  Bénassy-Quéré et al., supra note 27. 
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B. The European Stability Mechanism 
The ESM is at the core of the euro area sovereign debt crisis 
management framework. The ESM is an international organization in 
2012 in the wake of the euro area debt crisis. The ESM has the objective 
to “mobilize funding and provide stability support under strict 
conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument 
chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are 
threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member 
States.”42 Given that the ESDRF proposal advanced in this Article 
foresees a central role for the ESM, this Section briefly outlines the 
ESM’s tasks and its functioning, with a particular focus on its role in 
debt restructurings. 
1. Features and functions 
The ESM is an international body that lends to euro area 
governments that have lost access to international credit markets.43 It 
is based on an international treaty that operates outside EU law, but it 
is still connected to the EU legal framework.44 For instance, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has limited jurisdiction 
over the interpretation of the ESM Treaty.45 The original EMU 
governance framework did not envisage any permanent mechanism for 
financial assistance to euro area Member States experiencing or 
threatened by financial difficulties.46 Given the fear of contagion 
sparked by the euro area sovereign debt crisis, policymakers saw no 
alternative to devising a mechanism that provides temporary liquidity 
 
42.  Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism art. 3, Feb. 2, 2012, [hereinafter 
ESM Treaty]. 
43.  See, e.g., Ledina Gocaj & Sophie Meunier, Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM, and 
the Euro Crisis, 35 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 239 (2013). 
44.  This connection inter alia stems from the fact that the ESM Treaty has to respect EU 
law, as for instance clarified in the Pringle case. See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of 
Ireland, 2012 E.C.R. 756, ¶ 178. 
45.  See ESM Treaty, supra note 42, art. 37. To finance its operations, the ESM taps capital 
markets and thereby leverages the capital paid in by ESM Member States, which allows it to 
obtain a very favorable credit rating that can be translated into cheap financing for countries in 
distress, see EUR. STABILITY MECHANISM, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2016). 
46.  See TFEU, supra note 19, art. 125, which entails the no-bailout clause. For a discussion 
of the no-bailout clause, see, e.g., Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial: The No-Bailout Clause 
and Rescue Packages, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 978 (2010) (noting that “[t]he no-bailout 
clause is an essential part of the’budgetary code’ of the Union, and beyond its literal wording 
is . . . the expression of the responsibility of each Member State for its own public finance. . . .”). 
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assistance to Member States with the aim of safeguarding financial 
stability in the euro area as a whole.47 
In essence, the ESM lends to states that have lost market access, 
providing liquidity for below-market rates during periods of financial 
stress.48 In this sense, the ESM assumes the role of an international 
lender of last resort to euro area sovereigns,49 whereby the ESM’s 
claims rank above those of private creditors and only below those of 
the IMF.50 The flipside of receiving money from other euro area 
Member States when regular access to markets is impaired is the 
macroeconomic conditionality attached to the ESM’s lending 
programs, which—to a large extent—mimics the IMF’s long-standing 
practice of demanding meaningful macroeconomic adjustment in 
exchange for emergency loans.51 
At the same time, the ESM entails a very rudimentary legal 
framework for debt restructuring. The only reference to debt 
restructuring is in Recital (12) of the ESM Treaty and reads as follows: 
“[i]n accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate 
and proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be 
considered in cases where stability support is provided accompanied 
by conditionality in the form of a macro-economic adjustment 
programs.”52 
While this provision reflects a compromise between euro area 
governments not to ex-ante rule out the restructuring of bonds to restore 
 
47.  See, e.g., ESM Treaty, supra note 42, recital (6) (stating that “[t]he ESM may therefore 
provide stability support on the basis of a strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial 
assistance instrument chosen if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area 
as a whole and of its Member States.”). 
48.  For a discussion of the ESM and previous crisis management mechanisms for the euro 
area, see, e.g., Matthias Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, 48 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1777 (2011). 
49.  While the term “lender of last resort” is often associated with the ECB’s function of 
providing liquidity to banks if market funding dries up, it is also used in the context of the IMF 
or the ESM, whose role it is to replace market funding for sovereigns in crisis. 
50.  See, e.g., Klaus Regling, ESM Managing Director, The Next Steps to Make the Euro 
Area More Resilient (Feb. 16, 2016), available at https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/2017_02_16_kr_speech_munich.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MZF-9WUM]. 
51.  For an overview of the IMF’s lending practices, see Olivier Jeanne, Jonathan D. Ostry 
& Jeromin Zettelmeyer, A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality (IMF, 
Working Paper No. WP/08/236, 2008), available at https://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08236.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXW8-XARZ]. So far, ESM loans have been 
provided to Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece, with Greece remaining the only 
country which has not yet exited its ESM financial assistance program. 
52.  ESM Treaty, supra note 42, recital (12). 
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debt sustainability, it may cause more confusion than clarification. 
First, neither the ESM Treaty nor publicly accessible policy documents 
describe what applying the IMF’s practice would mean in the context 
of an ESM program53 or suggest that the ESM would follow the IMF’s 
approach to debt restructuring. Second, it is easy to conceive the kind 
of legal, political, and practical problems that arise when the ESM is to 
ascertain whether or not a debt crisis is indeed “exceptional.” Third, the 
level of adequacy and proportionality of debt restructuring measures is 
likely to remain subject to an ex-post interpretation by national courts, 
which have a very mixed track record in supporting the orderly 
resolution of sovereign debt.54 
In this regard, it should be noted that the first version of the ESM 
Treaty, which was signed on July 11, 2011 by seventeen Member 
States, but never entered into force, entailed much more specific 
language as regard debt sustainability assessment and private sector 
involvement.55 The first version of the ESM Treaty thus suggests that 
 
53.  For instance, it is not clear whether this provision refers to IMF practice at the time of 
the drafting of the ESM Treaty (i.e. 2011) or whether the provision is to be interpreted 
dynamically. This question is particularly important given that the IMF has already adjusted its 
Exceptional Access policy since 2011. 
54.  See, e.g., for recent developments in U.S. jurisprudence in the realm of sovereign debt 
restructuring in Juan J. Cruces & Tim R. Samples, Settling Sovereign Debt’s ‘Trial of the 
Century’, 31 EMORY L. REV. 5 (2016); Joseph Cotterill, Choose Your Own Adventure, 
Sovereign Debt Trial of the Century Edition, FIN. TIMES ALPHAVILLE (Feb. 8, 2013), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/02/08/1379162/choose-your-own-adventure-sovereign-debt-
trial-of-the-century-edition/ [https://perma.cc/95LB-RW89]; Jesse Kaplan, Collective Action 
and the Competence of Courts: The Lessons of NML v. Argentina, 20 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 
1 (2014). It is also mentioned, however, that US courts have recently reversed course after the 
Argentine government settled with the holdouts. For an overview of the debate, see, e.g., Lee 
Buchheit & Andrés de la Cruz, Pari Passu Reinterpreted, INT. FIN. L. REV. (2018), 
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3783277/Pari-passu-reinterpreted.html [https://perma.cc/ZLL5-
YYZV]. 
55.  See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, July 11, 2011, available 
at https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_stability_mechanism_11_july_
2011-en-cb18477d-69e4-4645-81a9-3070e02d245a.html [https://perma.cc/MAT7-AFKS]. 
Note that this Treaty was not ratified by Member States and thus never entered into force. The 
relevant provision about debt restructuring reads as follows: 
 
An adequate and proportionate form of private-sector involvement shall be sought on 
a case-by-case basis where financial assistance is received by an ESM Member, in 
line with IMF practice. The nature and the extent of this involvement shall depend on 
the outcome of a debt sustainability analysis and shall take due account of the risk of 
contagion and potential spill-over effects on other Member States of the European 
Union and third countries. If, on the basis of this analysis, it is concluded that a macro-
economic adjustment programme can realistically restore public debt to a sustainable 
path, the beneficiary ESM Member shall take initiatives aimed at encouraging the 
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the lack of clarity in the current Recital (12) of the ESM Treaty was not 
the result of an accidental omission. Rather, it is likely to have reflected 
a political compromise between those pushing for more ex-ante rules 
and those advocating ex-post discretion. 
For the purpose of this Article, the first draft of the ESM Treaty 
holds important lessons and truths both legally and politically. First, it 
circumscribes the outer boundaries of legal language that was 
acceptable to Member States, at least for the period between July 2011, 
when the first version of the ESM Treaty was signed, and February 
2012, when the current version of the ESM Treaty was signed. Linking 
the granting of ESM financial assistance to the Member State’s 
commitment to ensure PSI seems not to have raised any constitutional 
law issues in Member States, given that the Heads of State signed this 
first version of the Treaty.56 Second, Member States were ready to 
clarify the ESM’s approach to situations of questionable solvency, i.e., 
if the debt sustainability analysis (“DSA”) yields a negative result.57 
The proposed framework, as discussed further below, essentially 
reflects the IMF’s access policy and, in part, goes even beyond it.58 
2.  Reconciling the no-bailout clause with official-sector financial 
assistance: The Pringle case 
The ESM’s legality under EU law, particularly with respect to the 
no-bailout clause and Article 125 of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
 
main private investors to maintain their exposure. Where it is concluded that a macro-
economic adjustment programme cannot realistically restore the public debt to a 
sustainable path, the beneficiary ESM Member shall be required to engage in active 
negotiations in good faith with its non-official creditors to secure their direct 
involvement in restoring debt sustainability. In the latter case, the granting of financial 
assistance will be contingent on the ESM Member having a credible plan for restoring 
debt sustainability and demonstrating sufficient commitment to ensure adequate and 
proportionate private-sector involvement. Progress in the implementation of the plan 
will be monitored under the programme and will be taken into account in the decisions 
on disbursements. 
 
56.  See id. For further discussion, see also infra III.D.1. 
57.  See, e.g., CINZIA ALDICI AND DANIEL GROS, DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENTS: 
THE STATE OF THE ART 17 (2018), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/624426/IPOL_IDA(2018)624426_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MR2P-UG57] (stating that “[a]ny decision to grant financial assistance to a 
country (or rather its government) must be preceded by an analysis of the sustainability of public 
finances”). 
58.  Id. (discussing the IMF’s framework for situations of questionable solvency of a 
requesting Member). 
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the EU (“TFEU”), has been questioned from the very first days of its 
mentioning in official policy papers.59 At the time of negotiating the 
Maastricht Treaty, EU governments were reluctant to cede 
competences in monetary and economic policy to the European Union, 
thus deliberately fostering an asymmetric framework for EMU.60 
Monetary policy tasks were transferred to the ECB and the European 
System of Central Banks (“ESCB”), while the role of the European 
Union in economic policy was limited to the adoption of coordinating 
measures.61 In the context of the ESM’s establishment, the CJEU 
addressed the question of whether the establishment of the ESM 
transgressed the boundaries set out by EU law in its f amous Pringle 
case.62 The CJEU held, on the one hand, that the amended Article 
136(3) TFEU did not create a new (economic policy) competence for 
the Union, and, on the other hand, that the ESM was compatible with 
the no-bailout clause under Article 125 TFEU.63 
More specifically, the CJEU found that “Article 125 TFEU does 
not prohibit the granting of financial assistance by one or more Member 
States to a Member State which remains responsible for its 
commitments to its creditors provided that the conditions attached to 
such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement 
a sound budgetary policy.”64 
Strict ESM conditionality, designed to foster sound budgetary 
policy, and the fact that the recipient Member State remained liable to 
repay the sums lent, convinced more critical voices in the CJEU that 
the ESM was not a backdoor to permanent fiscal transfers within the 
euro area.65 Regarding the issue of debt restructuring, the Pringle 
decision is silent. This said, one could infer from the CJEU’s 
conclusions that the restructuring of sovereign bonds issued by the 
 
59.  See, e.g., Communication from the European Commission and the Council and the 
Economic and Financial Committee on the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 
COM(2010) 713 final, (Nov. 30, 2011).. 
60.  See generally Paul de Grauwe & Marc-Alexandré Sénégas, Asymmetries in the 
Monetary Policy Transmission: Some Implications for EMU and its Enlargement, 42 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 757 (2004). 
61.  Chris Koedooder, The Pringle Judgment: Economic and/or Monetary Union?, 37 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 111 (2013). 
62.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, 2012 E.C.R. 756. 
63.  Id. at ¶¶ 129-47. 
64.  Id. at ¶¶ 138-41. 
65.  Id. 
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recipient country does not run counter to EU law.66 Indeed, the right to 
restructure public debt is generally deemed to be in the sovereign’s 
discretion, albeit important limitations may result when combined with 
a financial assistance program.67 
3. The Euro Area Model CAC (Euro CAC) 
The ESM Treaty also introduced a new system for PSI in the 
EMU, mandating the inclusion of CACs in all euro area government 
bonds issued after July 1, 2013 (“Euro CAC”).68 The Euro CAC 
essentially enables a majority of bondholders to approve a restructuring 
plan proposed by the government instead of requiring unanimous 
agreement with the debt workout.69 Their purpose is two-fold: first, the 
obligation on euro area Member States to use CACs would alleviate 
holdout problems in future restructuring and second, with the inclusion 
of CACs, ESM signatories could consider debt restructuring a feasible 
policy option to remedy deep debt crises in exceptional cases.70 
 
66.  Indeed, the Troika required the Greek government to implement a debt restructuring 
in order to be eligible for additional financial assistance in early 2012; see The Second Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra note 30. 
67.  See, e.g., Vassilis Paliouras, The Right to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 20 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 115 (2017). 
68.  ESM Treaty, supra note 42, art. 12(3). 
69.  See Econ. & Fin. Comm., Sub-Comm. on EU Sovereign Debt Mkts., Common 
Terms of Reference of the Euro area model CAC, EUROPA (Feb. 17, 2012), 
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K48X-NELK] [hereinafter ESDM]. In addition, to alleviate certain conflicts 
of interest, the Euro CAC also includes disenfranchisement clauses, which excludes government 
bonds held by the issuer or by any of its ministries, departments or agencies from the CAC 
voting procedure. As stated in the Explanatory Note accompanying the Euro CAC, 
‘disenfranchising an issuer’s holdings of its own bonds is appropriate because the losses suffered 
by the issuer from the modification of the bonds it holds, unlike the losses suffered by an 
ordinary market participant, are more than offset by the gains realized by the issuer from the 
resulting reduction in its debt service or debt stock or both.’ See ESDM, Collective Action 
Clause – Explanatory Note, EUROPA (July 26, 2011), 
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/explanatory_note_draft_on_the_model_cac_-
_26_july.pdf [https://perma.cc/U683-7S3C]. 
70.  In our view, this is the only sensible way of interpreting the euro area governments’ 
decision to move to CACs. Before the euro area crisis, CACs were exclusively considered in the 
context of foreign law government bond issues in Europe; see, e.g., Implementation of the EU 
Commitment on Collective Action Clauses in Documentation of International Debt Issuance 
(Econ. & Fin. Comm., ECFIN/CEFCPE(2004)REP/50483 final), Nov. 12, 2004, available at 
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cacs_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJH7-L29U] 
(concerning the implementation of CACs for active issuers in the EU who issued debt under a 
foreign jurisdiction). For a discussion of the rationale of inserting CACs in domestic law-
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With the introduction of Euro CACs, the legal technique 
employed in the Greek PSI of 2012,71 i.e., to retrofit CACs to domestic 
law bonds in order to facilitate a ‘voluntary’ debt restructuring, will no 
longer be necessary. The introduction of Euro CACs will considerably 
enhance legal certainty for investors in the event of another debt crisis. 
Indeed, recent studies suggest that investors value the fact that states 
are—to some extent—bound to a predefined procedure for PSI.72 By 
making the inclusion of Euro CACs mandatory under the ESM Treaty, 
investors can now expect that states will restructure their debts in line 
with the statutory voting threshold rather than any other arbitrary, 
perhaps more expedient, procedure for the state in distress.73 
However, while the Euro CACs are the single most useful 
contractual tool to provide for more orderly and fair debt restructurings, 
they are no panacea.74 For instance, holdout investors may still acquire 
a blocking position given that Euro CACs require an affirmative vote 
of at least sixty-six percent or two-thirds of bondholders in each 
individual series and that holdouts may act in concert.75 In this respect, 
Euro CACs differ from the international standard for sovereign bonds 
issued in foreign capital markets, which only requires one vote for all 
series and an affirmative vote of seventy-five percent of bondholders.76 
 
governed debt securities, see, e.g., Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses 
for the Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 2045 (2013). 
71.  See supra II.A. for an overview of the Greek PSI. 
72.  See, e.g., Antonio Guglielmi, Javier Suarez & Carlo Signani, Country Update, Italy: 
Re-denomination Risk Down as Time Goes By, MEDIOBANCA SECURITIES COUNTRY UPDATE, 
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://marcello.minenna.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Italy-2017-01-19.pdf. 
73.  See, e.g., Grund, supra note 34. 
74.  In the pertinent literature, it is widely acknowledged that CACs are insufficient to 
address inefficiencies in the restructuring process other than the holdout problem. See, e.g., Anna 
Gelpern, Sovereign Debt: Now What?, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 45, 91 (2016); Ben Emons, 
Collective Action Clauses: No Panacea for Sovereign Debt Restructurings, PIMCO VIEWPOINT 
(Oct. 2012), https://www.pimco.com/en-us/insights/viewpoints/viewpoints/collective-action-
clauses-no-panacea-for-sovereign-debt-restructurings [https://perma.cc/9SPK-X898]. 
75.  In this respect, the Euro CACs differ from the ICMA, which requires a (super) majority 
of seventy-five percent of bondholders to consent to a contractual modification suggested by the 
sovereign. The purpose of the so-called “aggregation feature” is to mitigate holdout behavior 
more effectively. For a comparison of the two different types of CACs, see, e.g., IMF, 
Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring, IMF Policy Paper (Oct. 2014), at 19-20, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf [https://perma.cc/366X-C4U8]. Also 
see infra III.F.1. for a discussion as to why the Euro CAC should be aligned to the international 
standard. 
76.  For the international standard for English and New York law sovereign bonds, see 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, STANDARD COLLECTIVE ACTION 
AND PARI PASSU CLAUSES FOR THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES (Aug. 
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Not surprisingly, the CAC retrofitted to Greek-law bonds contained full 
aggregation feature, which meant that they deviated from the standard 
European governments had agreed upon just months before.77 This was 
deemed vital for the success of the Greek debt restructuring operation. 
Against this backdrop, we propose some amendments to the Euro 
CACs as explained below.78 
III. A EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
FRAMEWORK (“ESDRF”) 
“While the creation of the IMF’s SDRM was rejected 
on the grounds that it would interfere with national 
sovereignty, this objection is much less valid at 
European level where states have agreed to share 
sovereignty within the framework of the EU’s 
community of law.” 
- Gianviti et al., Bruegel, November 2010.79 
A. Introduction 
Throughout the past decade, a number of authors have argued that 
EMU governance still does not contain the requisite tools to remedy 
 
2014), available at https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-
Practice/Primary-Markets/primary-market-topics/collective-action-clauses/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZC7-ZDMJ] [hereinafter ICMA]. The ICMA CAC has been perceived 
relatively positively by the market and approximately 89% of the New York law governed bonds 
included enhanced CACs, compared with approximately 80% of newly issued English law 
bonds. See IMF, Second Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions 
in International Sovereign Bond Contracts (Jan. 2017), available at https://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2017/122716.pdf [https://perma.cc/T63Q-ZQPG]. The Euro CAC does have 
a limited aggregation feature, which however does not resolve the holdout problem; see infra 
III.F.1. 
77.  See supra II.A. It became evident that holdout inefficiencies pose real problems to debt 
restructuring when, during the Greek PSI, several hedge funds thwarted the restructuring of 17 
series of English-law bonds by acquiring minority blocking positions. See Zettelmeyer et al., 
supra note 34, 538, which noted: 
 
[u]nlike the English-law bonds, this threshold applied across bonds rather than just 
bond-by-bond, subject only to a participation quorum of at least 50% of face value. 
In the end, this aggregation feature turned out to be pivotal for the results of the debt 
exchange, as it allowed the restructuring of 100% of the Greek law sovereign bonds, 
which themselves made up over 86% of the bonds covered by the restructuring. 
 
78.  See infra III.F.1. 
79.  Gianviti et al., supra note 17, at 21. 
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the sovereign debt problem in Member States.80 Against the backdrop 
of existing proposals, as well as the authors’ own analysis, the 
subsequent sections seek to explain how a better debt restructuring 
framework could be designed, focusing, in particular, on its legal 
features and functions.81 For the sake of clarity, it is noted that the term 
“ESDRF” is neither equivalent to the ESM nor a potential European 
Monetary Fund (“EMF”).82 Rather, the ESDRF should be understood 
as an umbrella term that consists of a set of rules with the shared 
objective of rendering debt restructurings more orderly, transparent, 
and fair.83 Moreover, it is emphasized that the ESDRF would not 
“force” countries into debt restructurings,84 but rather clarify the 
mechanics of crisis lending when debt is unsustainable. Whether or not 
debt should be restructured remains, at all times, a sovereign decision.85 
B. Existing Proposals 
Most of the existing proposals for a debt restructuring mechanism 
in the euro area have discussed the potential (economic) benefits of a 
statutory solution to debt restructuring in the euro area.86 At the center 
 
80.  Charles Wyplosz, The Six Flaws of the Eurozone, 31 ECON. POL. 559 (2016). For a 
recent analysis of the status of sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area from a legal 
perspective, see, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring in 
Europe, 9 GLOBAL POL. 65 (2018). 
81.  A review of the pertinent literature revealed a paucity of in-depth analyses of the legal 
framework that may underpin such mechanism. Here, this Article aims at making a serious 
contribution to scholarship that should serve as a starting point for future work and research. 
82.  The EMF has been proposed as an enhanced ESM anchored in Union law by the 
European Commission in December 2017; see infra III.C.3. for an overview of the proposal. 
83.  In the given context, an orderly debt restructuring is one where holdouts’ interference 
is reduced and a fair debt restructuring is one where the burden of adjustment is appropriately 
shared between the private and public sector. 
84.  As the ECB held in 2012 in the context of the Greek PSI, “it remains the sole 
responsibility of the Government of the Hellenic Republic to take the necessary action that will 
ultimately ensure its debt sustainability.” See European Central Bank, Opinion Of The European 
Central Bank of 17 February 2012 on the Terms of Securities Issued or Guaranteed by the Greek 
State, CON/2012/12 (2012), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_
2012_12_f_sign.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5J2-LEEG]. 
85.  Paliouras, supra note 67. 
86.  Andritzky et al., supra note 18, at 6-10; see also Table 1 for an overview. The debate 
is closely linked to the establishment of the EMF. See, e.g., Marcel Fratzscher, Why a Franco-
German Bargain Will Help Secure the Euro, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3a0a4406-7d0b-11e7-ab01-a13271d1ee9c [https://perma.cc/
UK4S-VRF3]. Compare Daniel Gros & Thomas Mayer, How to deal with sovereign default in 
Europe: Create the European Monetary Fund now!, CEPS POLICY BRIEF No. 202 (May 17, 
2010) with Laurence Boone & Shahin Vallée, Europe Needs True Fiscal Integration, Not Its 
Own IMF, THE ECONOMIST, (May 9, 2017). 
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of all proposals for an ESDRF lies the objective of restoring 
sustainability of public debt levels and, in doing so, ensuring a fair level 
of burden-sharing between private creditors and the sovereign debtor.87 
A more transparent and efficient framework for debt restructuring in 
the euro area, so the general argument goes, may considerably enhance 
the ESM’s effectiveness, as the need for ESM liquidity, i.e., bailouts, 
will likely be lower. As Table 1 illustrates, different designs for an 
ESDRF have been discussed. 
The majority of proposed frameworks entail a pre-positioned 
crisis resolution mechanism for sovereign default. Most proposals seek 
to combine ex-ante market discipline with an ex-post procedure to deal 
with holdout creditors. With regard to the legal basis, it appears that the 
majority of commentators prefer the intergovernmental over the EU 
approach, which means that the enhanced debt restructuring framework 
would be governed by the ESM Treaty.88 Agreement also seems to 
exist in respect of the need to enhance the current design of CACs, 
which entails a two-limb voting procedure that is more prone to holdout 
strategies.89 
 
 
87.  At least since the proposal of fourteen top French and German economists, who can 
also be considered relatively independent, the accusation that sovereign debt restructuring is an 
idea pushed by Germans to impose their ordoliberalist way of thinking to punish countries for 
expansionary fiscal policies does not hold anymore. See Bénassy-Quéré et al., supra note 27. 
88.  See infra III.C.2. for a discussion of the potential legal basis of an ESDRF. 
89.  See infra III.F.1. for ways to improve the resilience of CACs used in the euro area. 
Table 1: Overview of ESDRF Proposals 
Proposal Legal 
basis 
Dispute 
settlement 
process 
Interim 
financing 
Restructuring 
process 
ECRM 
European 
Crisis 
Resolution 
Mechanism 
(Gianviti et 
al., 2010) 
EU 
Treaties 
• Specialized 
chamber at the 
CJEU to 
initiate and 
supervise 
negotiations 
• No further 
details on the 
set-up 
• European 
Financial 
Stability Facility 
as a permanent 
institution 
(which is part of 
today’s ESM) 
• ESM financial 
assistance 
• Debtor 
country 
launches 
negotiations 
• Moratorium 
of payments 
and stay on 
litigation 
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(linked to 
conditionality) 
• No further 
details on 
haircut size etc. 
EMF 
European 
Monetary 
Fund 
(Mayer/Gros, 
2010) 
EU 
Treaties 
• Not specified 
• Provided by 
the EMF (similar 
to the ESM) 
• Liquidity 
measures in a 
first step 
• Restructuring 
of debt in a 
second step to a 
level of sixty 
percent of GDP 
(akin to a 
Brady deal) 
ESDRF 
European 
Sovereign 
Debt 
Restructuring 
Framework 
(Bagchi, 
2013) 
ESM 
Treaty 
• Arbitration 
under the 
auspices of an 
independent 
European 
Sovereign 
Debt 
Restructuring 
Council 
• Procedure 
guided by 
UNIDROIT 
Principles of 
Transnational 
Civil 
Procedure 
• Not specified 
• ESDRF is 
activated after 
debt is deemed 
unsustainable 
by the ESM 
• Dispute 
settlement body 
oversees 
ESDRF 
proceedings 
and related 
matters 
• Moratorium 
on creditor 
payments and 
immunity from 
creditor 
enforcement 
ESDRR 
European 
Sovereign 
Debt 
Restructuring 
Regime 
(Committee 
on 
ESM 
Treaty 
• Not specified 
• ESM lending 
conditional upon 
debt 
restructuring 
• Seniority of 
liquidity 
provision 
• Aggregated 
majority voting 
• ESM funds 
immunized 
from holdout 
litigation 
• Restructuring 
with the aim of 
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C. Legal Basis 
This Section analyzes the legal basis of an ESDRF. Given that an 
enhanced framework for debt restructurings is inextricably bound to 
the ESM’s function as a crisis resolution mechanism, two legal bases 
may be envisaged: EU law or international law (ESM Treaty).90 
 
90.  The European Commission noted in its Reflection Paper of summer 2017 that several 
methods for strengthening EMU’s legal framework are possible, including by way of the EU 
Treaties and the EU institutions, an intergovernmental approach, or a mixture of both as is 
already the case today. See Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary 
Union, Eur. Comm. (May 31, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
reflection-paper-emu_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X66A-R5JX]. 
International 
Economic 
Policy 
Reform, 
2013) 
decreasing debt 
to 90% of GDP 
(liquidity crisis) 
or 60% of GDP 
(insolvency) 
VIPS 
Viable 
Insolvency 
Procedure for 
Sovereigns 
(Fuest et al., 
2015) 
ESM 
Treaty 
• Not specified 
• ESM provides 
shelter loans for 
three-year period 
• Seniority of 
liquidity 
provision 
• Trigger based 
on the DSA 
• Restructuring 
not below sixty 
percent debt-to-
GDP ratio 
• Aggregated 
majority voting 
MRSDR 
Mechanism 
to Regulate 
Sovereign 
Debt 
Restructuring 
(German 
Council of 
Economic 
Experts, 
2016) 
ESM 
Treaty 
• Not specified 
• ESM financing 
includes 
maturity 
extension 
• DSA-based 
trigger 
• Debt 
restructuring 
only as a 
second step if 
maturity 
extension 
insufficient 
• Aggregated 
majority voting 
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1. EU law 
As Ioannidis points out, “[i]n the field of debt, neither creditors 
nor Member States should expect solidarity.”91 Indeed, the current 
Treaty framework is centered around a market-based paradigm, which 
subjects euro area Member States to market forces by constraining 
central bank intervention (Article 123(1) TFEU)92 or inter-country 
financial assistance (Article 125(1) TFEU).93 From a primary law point 
of view, the main question when it comes to government debt 
restructuring within the euro area is whether the economic constitution 
prohibits, allows or even encourages it. 
In this regard, one ought to consider that the no-bailout clause 
limits official financial assistance and that the framework for sovereign 
debt in the euro area relies on market logic.94 As stated by the CJEU in 
the Pringle case, compliance with market discipline contributes at EU 
level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the 
 
91.  Michael Ioannidis, Debt restructuring in the light of Pringle and Gauweiler – 
flexibility and conditionality in ESCB LEGAL CONFERENCE 2016 (Oct. 2016), available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/escblegalconference2016_201702.en.pdf?e2dea3a78
485afe4c70d5d5010f368be [https://perma.cc/2NBZ-E4NT]. 
92.  Article 123(1) TFEU stipulates that: 
 
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank 
or with the central banks of the Member States [hereinafter national central banks] in 
favor of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, 
local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from 
them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments. 
 
TFEU, supra note 19, art. 123(1). 
93.  Article 125(1) TFEU reads as follows: 
 
The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or 
public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial 
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be 
liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other 
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint 
execution of a specific project. 
 
TFEU, supra note 19, art. 125(1). Of course, as explained above, the Pringle decision 
somewhat eroded the strict no-bailout principle. 
94.  See Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Government of Ireland, 2012 E.C.R. 756, ¶¶ 129-47 
(interpreting Article 125 of the TFEU rather broadly regarding the establishment of the ESM). 
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financial stability of the monetary union.95 The maxim of primary EU 
law is thus to preserve the incentives for Member States to pursue 
sound budgetary policies.96 This rationale has to be respected not just 
in good times, but especially during economic downturns, where ESM 
support may become necessary. In the context of ESM lending, debt 
restructuring ensures that the role of markets is preserved, which is 
already reflected in the current Recital (12) of the ESM Treaty.97 
A preliminary conclusion would thus be that the current 
framework for sovereign debt restructuring under the auspices of the 
ESM Treaty could be transferred into EU law and that such transfer 
would not raise serious legal concerns. Also, with respect to an 
enhanced ESDRF, which is further discussed below,98 the legal 
assessment should not reach a different conclusion. First, giving a 
stronger role to the ESM with respect to debt sustainability analyses 
would follow the market discipline logic of Article 125 TFEU. Second, 
enhanced contractual provisions to mitigate holdout problems would 
make PSIs more orderly and should therefore serve the more general 
EU objective of increasing financial stability. Third, the creation of a 
dispute resolution function would mitigate the ex-post coordination 
failures in debt restructuring, thereby ensuring that the adverse effects 
of debt restructuring would be minimized to the greatest extent 
possible. 
With regard to a concrete legal basis for a crisis resolution 
mechanism under EU law, Article 352 TFEU has been mentioned.99 
This “flexibility clause” provides for subsidiary powers100 that enable 
the Union legislator to adopt an act of secondary legislation necessary 
to attain the objectives laid down by the Treaty.101 The application of 
 
95.  Id. ¶ 135. 
96.  Id. at ¶¶ 136-39. 
97.  But see Paliouras, supra note 67, at 120-21 (noting that it remains within the remit of 
the sovereign’s discretion to make the arguably complex decision in favor or against such 
measure). 
98.  See infra III.D., III.E., and III.F. 
99.  See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
IN THE EU, 2010-11, HL 124-II, at 113 (UK) (noting, however, “that it is very difficult to build 
[a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism] under secondary [EU] law”). 
100.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5, June 7, 2016, 2016 
O.J. (C 202) 18 [hereinafter TEU]. The principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 TEU, 
stipulates that the EU may not take action unless such action is more effective in attaining the 
Union’s objective than action taken at national, regional or local level. Id. 
101.  See TFEU, supra note 19, art. 352. Article 352 requires the European Commission to 
propose a certain act, which the Council of the European Union has to adopt unanimously and 
2019] SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 819 
Article 352 TFEU in respect of the establishment of an ESDRF poses 
challenges in light of the conditions that must be met in order for it to 
be activated: (i) the action must be necessary to attain one of the EU’s 
objectives, (ii) no existing provision of the Treaty provides for action 
to attain the objective, and (iii) the envisaged action must not lead to 
the EU’s competences being extended beyond those provided for by 
the Treaties.102 The ESM would then become one of the many EU 
agencies, without its own statute, its own capital, or a strong legal 
status. 
This analysis suggests that the optimal legal basis for an improved 
crisis resolution mechanism—that includes the enhanced framework 
for sovereign debt restructuring proposed herein—would be the EU 
Treaties. First, as mentioned above, there are no obstacles in the current 
Treaty to insert new Articles on the ESM. Second, the Treaties provides 
both a legitimate and a sound legal basis for an important institution 
like the ESM–be it with or without the debt restructuring features 
discussed in this paper. Of course, Treaty change may remain a long-
term objective. Hence, the next section argues that—over the short-
term—the ESM Treaty may be a more realistic legal basis for an 
enhanced debt restructuring framework. 
2.  ESM Treaty 
It may be necessary in the short to medium-term to capitalize on 
the existing legal framework to enhance the current framework for debt 
restructuring. As proposed for instance by the Committee on 
International Economic Policy and Reform, the ESM Treaty may be 
amended to effect certain contractual changes aimed at further 
alleviating holdout inefficiencies.103 An amendment of the ESM Treaty 
would require unanimous agreement of all ESM Members (nineteen 
euro area Member States) and ratification, approval or acceptance of 
such amendment by these members, in accordance with their national 
 
to which the European Parliament has to consent. National Parliaments, too, need to be involved 
in the legislative process under Article 352 TFEU, albeit their consent is not required. Id. 
102.  Id. Moreover, resorting to Article 352 TFEU means that all actions taken by the ESM 
and/or EMF must comply with the so-called Meroni doctrine, which essentially constrains the 
Union legislator in respect of the creation of agencies or bodies that enjoy large discretion. For 
the overview of the issues, see e.g., Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, Meroni Circumvented? Article 
114 TFEU and EU Regulatory Agencies, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 64, 79-80 
(2014). 
103.  COMMITTEE ON INT’L. ECON. POL’Y AND REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN 
BANKRUPTCY, (Brookings Institution, Oct. 2, 2013), 40. 
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constitutional requirements, which includes the involvement of 
national parliaments in some Member States. 
While, therefore, the process entails some significant political 
steps, amending the ESM Treaty involves less complexity than revising 
the EU Treaties, as part of which referenda may have to be held in 
several euro area Member States.104 Given that the ESDRF would make 
debt restructuring more transparent, rather than fundamentally 
changing the market logic that is already reflected in the current ESM 
Treaty, there should be no obstacles to making the amendments 
suggested below. 
Of course, introducing an ESDRF via the ESM Treaty means that 
its scope of application would remain constrained to euro area countries 
and that the concerns created by having a crisis resolution framework 
outside the Treaty framework would linger on.105 Hence, Treaty 
change, which also seems warranted in several other policy fields, 
should be the preferred legal vehicle for policy and lawmakers to 
enhance the functioning and resilience of EMU. 
3.  The European Commission’s proposal to establish a European 
Monetary Fund 
While not directly relevant for an ESDRF, it is recalled that the 
European Commission has released plans to transform the ESM into a 
European Monetary Fund (“EMF”).106 In its recent EMF proposal, the 
European Commission has proposed to resort to Article 352 TFEU, as 
a legal basis for establishing the EMF.107 With this proposal, the 
European Commission sent a strong signal to the co-legislators that the 
strengthening of the EMU should be pursued progressively and, 
importantly, by making use of the existing Treaty framework.108 Thus, 
while the European Commission does not lack determination, it has 
opted for a very modest proposal that reluctantly or deliberately 
 
104.  This is why many scholars consider the ESM Treaty to be the better vehicle for 
sovereign debt reform; see, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The Problem 
of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings, (Jan. 22, 2013) (working 
paper), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5485&context=faculty
_scholarship [https://perma.cc/C5NK-K482]. 
105.  Id. at 9. 
106.  Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment of the European Monetary 
Fund, COM (2017) 827 final (Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter EMF Regulation]. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. 
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overlooks some of the essential legal and economic aspects of 
international crisis lending.109 
First, the European Commission proposes not to transfer Recital 
(12) of the ESM Treaty into EU law, according to which an adequate 
and proportionate form of debt restructuring may be considered in 
exceptional cases.110 Second, and closely linked to this point, the 
European Commission did not replicate the obligation for Member 
States to insert CACs in domestic government bonds in the EMF 
proposal.111 Without further delving into the politics of the ongoing 
discussions, it should be noted that the EMF proposal—for whatever 
reason—would introduce an even higher degree of ambiguity with 
respect to the ESM’s crisis management functions. 
D. Institutional Aspects 
The analysis of a suitable legal framework for an ESDRF is 
conducted against the backdrop of existing proposals,112 as well as 
recent jurisprudence by the CJEU and the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”).113 The Article assumes that, regardless of the legal 
basis chosen, the enhanced debt restructuring framework proposed 
 
109.  Id. Perhaps surprisingly, the European Commission’s proposal is even more muted 
on the issue of government debt restructuring than the ESM Treaty: in recital (12), the ESM 
Treaty states that “[i]n accordance with IMF practice, in exceptional cases an adequate and 
proportionate form of private sector involvement shall be considered in cases where stability 
support is provided accompanied by conditionality in the form of a macro-economic adjustment 
programme.” Conversely, the EMF Statute makes no reference whatsoever to the possibility of 
a debt restructuring; see Annex to the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Establishment 
of the European Monetary Fund, COM (2017) 827 final, (Dec. 6, 2017), [hereinafter Annex to 
the EMF Regulation]. 
110.  ESM Treaty, supra note 42, recital (12). 
111.  See EMF Regulation, supra note 100, at (52). Rather, the European Commission 
noted in a Recital (52) of the EMF Regulation that ‘[t]his Regulation should not affect the 
commitment agreed between the Contracting Parties to the Treaty establishing the ESM pursuant 
to Article 12(3) of that Treaty, namely that collective action clauses must be included in all new 
euro area government securities, with a maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that 
their legal impact is identical.’ Id. However, it can be argued that, once the ESM Treaty ceases 
to be in force, no obligation exists under international or Union law to insert CACs in euro area 
government bonds. While the European Commission has not further explained why it chose to 
propose the deletion of Article 12(3) of the ESM Treaty, its decision seems to reinforce the 
negative sentiment vis-à-vis PSI, given that CACs are the most effective means to secure debt 
relief. 
112.  Cf. Table 1. 
113.  See infra III.E.1. 
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herein would have to comply with EU law, as well as pertinent CEJU 
jurisprudence.114 
In order to attain the objective of rendering future debt 
restructuring more efficient and more orderly, the ESDRF could have 
four different features that build on and complement each other. These 
features serve and are thereby organized under three different 
functions, namely a financial, an economic and a legal function. Table 
2 illustrates these features and functions and explains how they are 
connected to one another. It is also noted that, akin to other proposals, 
such as the famous IMF blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (“SDRM”),115 the scope of the ESDRF procedure would 
only pertain to government bonds rather than other debt instruments, 
such as loans or guarantees.116 
 
 
 
 
 
114.  See, e.g., Press Release, General Court of the European Union, Judgements in Case 
T-680/13, K. Chrysostomides & Co. and Others v. Council and Others, and T-786/14 
Bourdouvali and Others v. Council and Others, available at https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-07/cp180108en.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS36-966U] 
(inter alia clarifying that EU institutions may be held accountable for their actions as part of 
ESM financial assistance programs). 
115.  See Anne O. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring IMF 
PAMPHLET SERIES, 2002, available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm
/eng/sdrm.pdf [https://perma.cc/68C4-SQY9]. 
116.  See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 396. 
117.  See infra III.D.1. 
Table 2: Matching the ESDRF’s features and functions 
Feature Function Description and objective(s) Status quo 
1. Activation 
of ESDRF in 
case of 
negative DSA 
 
Financial 
function117 
The activation of the 
ESDRF, and thus a 
government debt 
restructuring, should be 
required in exceptional 
cases as part of an ESM 
lending program, if the 
Member State’s debt is 
Very weak link 
between debt 
restructuring and 
ESM financial 
assistance 
program (Recital 
(12) ESM Treaty) 
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118.  See infra III.D.2. 
119.  See id. 
deemed unsustainable 
by the ESM Board of 
Governors (in line with 
existing IMF practices). 
It remains within the 
government’s discretion 
to activate the ESDRF 
and the ESM Board of 
Governors to demand a 
debt restructuring: in 
other words, there 
should be no automatic 
debt restructuring. 
2. Enhanced 
majority 
voting 
complemented 
by an 
emergency 
procedure if a 
CAC vote fails 
 
Legal 
function118 
A (super-)majority of 
creditors must be in a 
position to approve or 
reject a debt 
restructuring plan 
against the will of a 
minority of holdouts. In 
exceptional cases, if a 
CAC vote fails, the 
Member State would 
use the power to 
override existing 
contractual 
arrangements in line 
with existing 
constitutional legal 
limits, subject to review 
by the ESDRF legal 
function. 
Current Euro 
CACs lack full 
aggregation 
feature and no 
emergency 
procedure is in 
place in case a 
CAC vote fails 
(repeatedly). 
3. Statutory 
immunization 
of ESM funds 
 
Legal 
function119 
ESM funds disbursed to 
Member States should 
be protected from 
litigation by 
immunizing them from 
No legal 
safeguards exist 
to protect ESM 
funds from 
creditor 
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1. Financial function 
Pursuant to Article 12(1) of the ESM Treaty, “[i]f indispensable 
to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its 
Member States, the ESM may provide stability support to an ESM 
Member subject to strict conditionality.” The ESM’s lending decisions 
are the result of an intricate coordination procedure between different 
institutions, as set out in Article 13 of the ESM Treaty.121 However, as 
 
120.  See infra III.D.2. 
121.  See ESM Treaty art. 13, Feb. 2, 2012, Eur. Comm’n DOC/12/3 states that, more 
specifically, stability support can only be granted after an assessment by the European 
Commission, in liaison with the ECB, of: (a) the existence of a risk to the financial stability of 
the euro area as a whole or of its Member States; (b) sustainability of public debt (wherever 
appropriate and possible, such an assessment is expected to be conducted together with the IMF); 
attachment orders 
rendered by national 
courts. This would 
significantly reduce the 
attractiveness for 
litigious holdouts to 
attack debt 
restructurings that are 
accompanied by ESM 
financial assistance 
programs. 
attachment 
attempts. 
4. Dispute 
settlement 
process 
 
Legal 
function120 
All vertical (creditor-
debtor) and horizontal 
(inter-creditor) disputes, 
for instance on the 
equal application of the 
haircut size across 
different types of debt 
instruments, shall be 
settled by the ESDRF 
legal function, i.e., a 
specialized chamber at 
the CJEU or a 
sovereign debt 
arbitration tribunal. 
Disputes are 
currently 
resolved by 
national courts 
resulting in 
highly 
fragmented 
judicial review 
procedures across 
the euro area. 
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mentioned above, the provisions of the ESM Treaty122 concerning 
government debt restructuring are characterized by “constructive 
ambiguity.”123 This approach, albeit being the result of a deliberate 
political decision at the height of the crisis, may in the medium to long-
term undermine the reliability and credibility of the crisis resolution 
mechanism. The lack of formal or informal rules and practices to 
address situations when the Member State’s debt is deemed 
unsustainable, may increase uncertainty, result in “gambles for 
redemption,” and overburden the ESM in the case of large countries.124 
The majority of SDRM proposals for the euro area therefore aim 
at addressing this supposed “gap” in the ESM lending framework. 
When juxtaposed to IMF practices, the ESM lending framework differs 
on two points. 
 First, the IMF plays a catalytic, albeit informal, role as 
facilitator of debt restructuring negotiations. While the 
IMF Articles of Agreement do not require countries 
seeking to access Fund assistance to restructure their 
debts, the IMF encourages a member—wherever 
possible—to restructure unsustainable debt without a 
default.125 Indeed, as explained by IMF staff, “[w]here 
the debts being restructured are claims held by the private 
sector, the debt restructuring is normally implemented at 
the outset of the program or as a condition for the 
program’s first review.”126 
 Second, the IMF’s Lending into Arrears (“LiA”) policy 
limits Fund assistance to Member States that have not 
 
(c) the actual or potential financing needs of the ESM Member concerned. Ultimately, however, 
the ESM’s Board of Governors has the sole decision-making authority to grant stability support 
to an ESM Member. 
122.  See id., recital 12. 
123.  See Guntram Wolff, Europe needs a broader discussion of its future, VOXEU, (May 
4, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/europe-needs-broader-discussion-its-future (talking about the 
“current constructive ambiguity on when [a] restructuring would happen”). 
124.  As noted above, the first version of the ESM Treaty, which never entered into force, 
entailed rules to manage such situations; see Treaty Establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism, supra note 55. 
125.  See, e.g., Sean Hagan, Maurice Obstfeld & Poul M. Thomsen, Dealing with 
Sovereign Debt—The IMF Perspective, IMFBLOG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://blogs.imf.org/
2017/02/23/dealing-with-sovereign-debt-the-imf-perspective/. 
126.  Id. 
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cleared arrears to private127 or official creditors.128 
Through the LiA policy, the IMF can influence debt 
restructuring by (i) requiring a ‘haircut’ on investors’ debt 
as part of the required domestic adjustment and (ii) 
playing an active role in encouraging restructuring 
negotiations.129 
As Table 3 illustrates, the IMF, on the basis of its LiA policy, has 
developed a flexible yet clear framework to deal with situations for debt 
restructurings. 
 
Table 3: The IMF’s debt restructuring framework130 
 2002 Framework 2010 Framework 2016 Framework 
Debt is 
unsustainable Definitive debt 
restructuring/ 
official 
concessional 
financing131 
Definitive debt 
restructuring/offici
al concessional 
financing 
Definitive debt 
restructuring/ 
official 
concessional 
financing 
Debt is 
sustainable 
but not with 
high 
probability 
Definitive debt 
restructuring/ 
official 
concessional 
financing 
Maintain non-Fund 
exposure (e.g. re-
profiling or official 
financing) to 
improve debt 
 
127.  INT’L MON. FUND, IMF POLICY ON LENDING INTO ARREARS TO PRIVATE 
CREDITORS, (1999), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/ [https://
perma.cc/8JJT-AQ89]. The LiA policy aims at reducing private investors’ leverage in a debt 
restructuring deal by allowing the Fund to lend to countries even if arrears are outstanding. Id. 
128.  Reforming the Fund’s Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official 
Creditors, IMF POLICY PAPER, Dec. 2015, available at https://www.imf.org/external/
np/pp/eng/2015/101515.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3XP-D7JA]. 
129.  Aitor Erce, Sovereign Debt Restructurings and the IMF: Implications for Future 
Official Interventions 3-4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, Working Paper No. 143, Apr. 2013), 
https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/institute/wpapers/2013/0143.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JW2H-3KE4]. 
130.  See, e.g., IMF Survey: IMF Reforms Policy for Exceptional Access Lending, IMF 
SURVEY, Jan. 16, 2016, available at https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/
sopol012916a [https://perma.cc/43YS-SM58]. 
131.  “Official concessional financing” refers to special programs for highly indebted poor 
countries, and would thus be irrelevant in the context of (highly developed) euro area economies. 
For an explanation, see e.g., IMF Support for Low-Income Countries, IMF (Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-Support-for-Low-Income-Countries 
[https://perma.cc/QPD5-R6RJ]. 
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Overall, one may argue that the ESM lending framework could 
benefit from closer alignment with the IMF’s long-standing practices 
in sovereign debt restructurings. For one, additional clarity may allow 
investors to better anticipate the actions of the ESM. For another, the 
burden stemming from a debt crisis in the euro area may be more 
appropriately shared between the ESM, as contributor of liquidity 
assistance, and the private sector’s contributions by agreeing to debt 
relief measures. 
To this end, one may consider introducing an LiA policy for the 
ESM, as well as a stronger and more formalized role in facilitating 
negotiations between the private sector and the debtor state.132 This 
could provide decisions taken by the ESM Board of Governors in this 
regard with more legitimacy, given that the debtor state’s citizens as 
well as affected bondholders would have more clarity on the 
procedures that apply in the context of financial assistance programs in 
the euro area. For this purpose, one could also revisit the first draft of 
the ESM Treaty, which contains much clearer language on the 
procedure that ought to apply if countries’ debt levels are deemed 
unsustainable and if ESM financing is requested.133 Finally, the ESM 
may assume a more authoritative function in the context of analyzing 
the sustainability of a requesting Member State’s public debt.134 In the 
recent Meseberg Declaration on the future of EMU, the governments 
of Germany and France, for example, recalled that “any decision to 
 
132.  European Central Bank, supra note 15. Consequently, as mentioned in the ECB legal 
opinion, one may consider clarifying the ESM Treaty to cater to the “fundamental need for the 
ESM to be safeguarded against the moral hazard inherent in any crisis management 
mechanism.” Id. 
133.  See ESM Treaty, supra note 42, art. 12(2). 
134.  Id. art. 13(1) (requiring the COM to assess whether the public debt of a Member State 
requesting financial assistance is sustainable). 
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provide ESM stability” includes a DSA.135 Of course, what role the 
ESM’s financial function may ultimately play—and how it then 
interacts with other EU institutions—is to be decided on a political 
level and can hardly be anticipated at the current juncture. 
2. Legal function 
As mentioned above, the crisis resolution mechanism under the 
auspices of the ESM lacks a legal function.136 To ensure an independent 
review of debt restructuring measures by the legal function, the dispute 
resolution function should not be allocated to the body that also carries 
out the financial and/or economic function of the ESM. 
Some may question the very rationale for a dispute resolution 
mechanism. However, one important lesson from the Greek PSI is that 
the EU’s common response to the crisis was subject to review at the 
national level. Judges at civil or commercial courts in Germany, 
Austria, and Greece, as well as investment arbitrators at the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”), were asked to assess the legality and proportionality of a 
debt restructuring that had been decided at the central Union level.137 
Moreover, the judgments rendered after the Greek PSI suggest that 
 
135.  Meseberg Declaration – Renewing Europe’s Promises of Security and Prosperity, 
Jun. 19, 2018, available at https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/meta/startseite/
meseberg-declaration-1140806 [https://perma.cc/954K-HVAJ]. 
136.  See Gianviti et al., supra note 17, at 27. Out of the proposals referred to in Table 1, 
the ECRM proposed by Gianviti provides the most detailed description of a potential legal 
function an ESDRF could entail. It notes the following in this context: 
 
The legal body would have the authority to open a debt-restructuring procedure upon 
the request of a euro-area sovereign borrower and upon approval by the economic 
body that the debtor’s debt is actually unsustainable. It would be a common judicial 
organ capable of sorting out and assessing claims by the parties, of ruling on disputes 
between creditors or between a creditor and the debtor, and of enforcing the decisions 
taken by the parties within the framework of the mechanism. 
Id. 
 
Moreover, Bagchi elaborates on the legal framework for a debt restructuring mechanism 
in Europe, concluding that the ESM Treaty would provide the best legal basis for further reform. 
See Kanad Bagchi, Proposals For a Future European State Bankruptcy Law, SAAR BLUEPRINTS 
(2015), available at http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Proposals-for-a-
future-European-State-Bankruptcy-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5R7-SK6F]. 
137.  For a typical domestic law bond of a euro area government in Ireland, see, e.g., 4.50% 
Treasury Bond 2018, NTMA (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.ntma.ie/download/government_
bonds/Ireland_4_5pc_Treasury_Bond_2018_Offering_Circular.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WKY-
Z4UD]. 
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foreign municipal courts are ill-equipped to address the intricate legal 
questions that arise in sovereign debt restructurings, notably because of 
the ambiguity regarding their jurisdiction, as well as the lack of 
substantive rules to balance investor rights with the foreign 
governments’ public interest in restructuring its public debt.138 
E. A Dispute Resolution Mechanism for Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring 
Krueger,139 in 2002, and Gianviti et al.,140 in 2010, proposed the 
establishment of an independent legal body tasked with resolving both 
creditor-debtor and creditor-creditor disputes that arise in the course of 
a debt restructuring.141 In the same vein, this Section presents two 
different options for establishing a dispute resolution mechanism for 
debt restructurings in the euro area: (i) a specialized chamber at the 
CJEU, or (ii) an independent arbitration mechanism at a newly-
established body. Such dispute resolution mechanisms would be 
responsible for disputes relating to private bondholders’ claims and 
would not allow the CJEU to second-guess judgments made by 
creditors regarding the viability of a restructuring.142 A dispute 
resolution would, inter alia, be confronted with the following types of 
claims: verification of claims for the CAC vote; bondholder claims for 
performance of contract or damages in restructuring of non-CAC bonds 
or if CACs fail; inter-creditor disputes that arise from an alleged 
discrimination against specific bondholder classes; and disputes 
relating to the interpretation and application of a CAC as well as other 
clauses, such as pari passu clauses or bond acceleration clauses. 
 
138.  See, e.g., Sebastian Grund, The Legal Consequences of Sovereign Insolvency – A 
Review of Creditor Litigation in Germany Following the Greek Debt Restructuring, 24 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 399 (2017) (analyzing post-PSI litigation in Germany). 
Among the many reasons as to why municipal courts and investment tribunals have a very mixed 
track-record are the lack of expertise, the lack of authority as well as the lack of rules that would 
allow these bodies to balance the creditors’ right to repayment with the debtor’s need to reduce 
the level of debt – indeed the central question of bankruptcy law. 
139.  See Krueger, supra note 115. 
140.  See Gianviti et al., supra note 17. 
141.  See also Bagchi, supra note 136 (advocating for an arbitration-like dispute resolution 
procedure). 
142.  For rationale behind these limits, see Hagan, supra note 116; Gianviti et al., supra 
note 17. 
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1. Dispute Resolution at the CJEU 
It could be argued that the CJEU would be the most appropriate 
legal body to render the final decision in disputes that emerge in the 
wake of a debt restructuring in the euro area before national courts.143 
The CJEU is not only enshrined in EU law and enjoys strong statutory 
independence, it also benefits from a high level of legitimacy, as well 
as a sound governance framework. Given that the type of disputes the 
CJEU would have to adjudicate as part of the ESDRF, a specialized 
chamber, which would be established ad-hoc and comprise of experts 
in the field of sovereign debt, seems most appropriate.144 
At the current juncture, the ESM Board of Governors and, after 
some escalation, the CJEU only have jurisdiction for disputes 
pertaining to the interpretation of the ESM Treaty.145 However, this 
leads to gaps. First, the ESM Treaty only includes the requirement for 
the signatories to include CACs as agreed by the Economic and 
Financial Committee (“EFC”)—it does not set out the details of the 
CAC.146 Second, the ESM Treaty lacks provisions that would assign 
jurisdiction over disputes between the parties involved in a debt 
restructuring to the CJEU, or any other (quasi-)judicial authority—this 
choice is left with the Member States, which tend to choose their own 
courts as dispute settlement forum.147 Given that any ESM program 
involves financial assistance from all nineteen Member States and 
taking account of the multiple nationalities of holders of euro area debt 
 
143.  See Sapir & Schoenmaker, supra note 17; Louis, supra note 46. Such a separate 
chamber may be established by virtue of Article 257 TFEU, which sets out the following: “[t]he 
European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may establish specialized courts attached to the General Court to hear and determine 
at first instance certain classes of action or proceeding brought in specific areas.” TFEU, supra 
note 19, art. 257. 
144.  For some inspiration regarding the establishment of such a specialist chamber, see, 
e.g., Daniel Sarmiento, The Reform of the General Court: Unleashing the Forces of Change, 
EU LAW ANALYSIS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.de/2015/12/the-reform-of-
general-court-unleashing.html [https://perma.cc/XC3L-D6KF]. Whether changes to the Treaty 
would be required to cater for the establishment of a specialized chamber cannot be answered 
conclusively. 
145.  See ESM Treaty, supra note 42, at art. 37; see also Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-
Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective, 
32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 64, 72 (2014). 
146.  See Antonio Sainz de Vicuña, Identical Collective Action Clauses for Different Legal 
Systems: A European Model, in COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF 
SOVEREIGN DEBT 15-26 (Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas Cahn & Patrick Kenadijan, eds., 2013). 
147.  See, e.g., Grund, supra note 34, at 255.  
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securities, one could see merits in enabling bond investors and the 
debtor country to make a final appeal to the CJEU.148 
The main objective of providing the CJEU with jurisdiction over 
such bondholder disputes would be to mitigate externalities stemming 
from divergent national court decisions, thereby fostering consistency 
across the euro area.149 Virtually all sovereign debt restructurings entail 
some expropriatory element, for the debtor country needs to renegotiate 
or unilaterally amend contractual agreement with its bondholders.150 
Thus, delicate questions pertaining to the protection of the creditors’ 
property rights arise in the context of sovereign insolvency, which 
requires the state’s public interest in attaining debt relief to be balanced 
against the investors’ contractual right to be satisfied in full and on 
time.151 Such questions should ultimately be addressed by a judicial 
authority at the European level with a view at harmonizing the standard 
of legal review in euro area debt restructuring.152 
With respect to the substantive law applicable to the disputes, 
relevant national, as well as EU law, could be used. In this context, it 
is recalled that European (constitutional) laws have a common 
denominator, which could circumscribe the legal perimeter for debt 
restructuring measures: the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
148.  The problem with decentralized dispute resolution in the wake of euro area sovereign 
debt restructurings is for instance discussed by Grund, see Grund, supra note 138. 
149.  As stated above, the question of dispute settlement would only apply in the event of 
CACs failing to bind holdouts to a restructuring deal. 
150.  See, e.g., Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign 
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6931, 
Mar. 7, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997 [https://perma.cc/
3SVD-GQBT]. 
151.  For a discussion, see, e.g., Patrick R. Wautelet, The Greek Debt Restructuring and 
Property Rights. A Greek Tragedy for Investors?, (July 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373891 [https://perma.cc
/J8FF-Y8ZM]. 
152.  For a similar reasoning, see Hagan, supra note 116, at 382-90. Many European courts 
have adopted a broad interpretation of sovereign immunity while U.S. courts tend to look 
exclusively at the contractual agreement underpinning the debt instrument and award money 
judgements or injunctive remedies to any investors who undertakes to sue the insolvent 
sovereign. For an overview of municipal court decisions in Europe, see, e.g., Grund, supra note 
138. For US case law, see Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014); 
Allied Bank Int’l. V. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). With respect 
to Greece, the German Federal Supreme Court granted immunity to Greece for its CAC Retrofit 
while the Austrian Supreme Court rejected its immunity and referred the case to the CJEU to 
determine the court’s jurisdiction under the relevant provisions of EU secondary law. See 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 19, 2017, XI ZR 796, 2016 (Ger.); 
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 20 2017, 10 Ob 37/17t (Austria). 
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(“ECHR”). The Convention sets a certain minimum standard for the 
protection of bondholders’ (property) rights and was transposed in the 
domestic laws of all euro area Member States.153 Another potential 
basis for the judicial review of debt restructuring measures could be the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (“CFR”), which belongs to EU 
primary law and is thus directly enforceable against all EU Member 
States.154 However, the CFR only applies when EU law is 
implemented, typically excluding its applicability in sovereign debt 
restructuring cases.155 Of course, if the ESDRF was to be enshrined in 
EU law, then it may also be relevant for disputes pertaining to 
sovereign debt restructurings. 
In this context, the judicial review of official sector measures 
taken during the European sovereign debt crisis yielded some 
important insights as regards the boundaries for governments’ and/or 
EU institutions’ interference with private property rights.156 Notably, 
one decision by the ECtHR and two by the CJEU shone light on the 
legal relationship between private investors and sovereigns (as well as 
their central banks).157 First, following the Greek PSI,158 the ECtHR 
was confronted with several thousands of bondholder claims for 
compensation for the haircut imposed by Greece. In the seminal 
Mamatas v. Greece159 case, the ECtHR clarified important 
constitutional legal limits for signatories of the ECHR, holding that a 
haircut on privately held government debt is necessary and 
 
153.  For disputes not related to bondholders’ property rights, the ESM Treaty, which 
would then be transposed into national law, could set out certain rules, for instance on the 
verification of creditor claims for the CAC vote. 
154.  Frank Emmert & Chandler Piche Carney, The European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights vs. the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights on Fundamental 
Freedoms – A Comparison, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1047, 1090 (2017). 
155.  Id. at 1171 (noting that “to the extent the Charter [of Fundamental Rights] might 
provide substantially better protection, the Member States are not bound by it when adopting or 
implementing their own law outside of the sphere of application of EU law”). 
156.  René Repasi, Judicial protection against austerity measures in the euro area: Ledra 
and Mallis, 54 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1123 (2017). 
157.  For a recent and compelling overview of the CJEU’s jurisprudence on sovereign debt 
programs during the euro area debt crisis, see Claire Kilpatrick, The EU and Its Sovereign Debt 
Programmes: The Challenges of Liminal Legality, Eur. Univ. Inst. Dep’t. of Law Working Paper 
2017/14, Nov. 2017), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/48205/LAW_2017_14.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/2NS3-NJ26]. 
158.  See supra II.A. (discussing Greek debt restructuring). 
159.  Mamatas & Others v. Greece, No. 63066/14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016). More specifically, 
the judgement takes account of the fact that the market value of bonds has typically dramatically 
deteriorated in the run-up to a sovereign debt restructuring, implying that the face value should 
no longer serve as a benchmark for the creditors’ property rights. 
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proportionate if there is an imminent risk of default and the haircut does 
not place an excessive burden on private investors.160 Second, in 
Accorinti v. ECB,161 bondholders challenged the ECB’s carve-out from 
the PSI of 2012. The EU General Court decided that the ECB’s 
preferential treatment in a debt restructuring was justified since it 
acquired the bonds in the public interest.162 Third, in Ledra Advertising 
v. European Commission and ECB,163 the CJEU had to decide whether 
EU institutions could be held liable for a haircut on Cypriot depositors, 
which they required as part of the financial assistance programs to 
Cyprus.164 The CJEU found that while EU institutions must comply 
with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,165 and hence respect the 
right to property, such a right is not absolute and can be limited on 
grounds of public interest provided that the limitations do not constitute 
a disproportionate and undue interference with the very substance of 
the right guaranteed.166 
With respect to the procedural rules applicable to such disputes, 
the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU167 should, in principle, provide a 
sufficient basis to create a specialized chamber for the resolution of 
sovereign debt disputes.168 In this context, it should be mentioned that 
 
160.  For a discussion of the judgement, see, Grund, supra note 34. 
161.  Case T-79/13, Accorinti & Others v. ECB, 2015 available at http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-79/13 [https://perma.cc/S8CW-RXMU]. 
162.  Id. ¶ 92. 
163.  Case C-8/15, Ledra Advertising v. Commission & ECB, 2016, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-8/15%20P [https://perma.cc/VBX3-
R6P4]. 
164.  Id. The legal basis for the challenge was under Article 340 TFEU. See TFEU, supra 
note 19, art. 340. The investors’ challenged the decision by the two EU institutions to require 
the Cypriot government to impose the respective losses on depositors as part of the EU’s 
conditions to grant financial assistance to Cyprus. 
165.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 392. 
166.  Ledra Advertising, states that: 
 
In view of the objective of ensuring the stability of the banking system in the euro 
area, and having regard to the imminent risk of financial losses to which depositors 
with the two banks concerned would have been exposed if the latter had failed, such 
measures do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference impairing 
the very substance of the appellants’ right to property. 
 
Ledra Advertising, Case C-8/15 ¶74. 
167.  Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (L 265) 
1. In particular, one would need to consider amending Chapter 7 of the Rules of Procedure, 
which pertain to the different formations of the Court. Id. ch. 7. 
168.  See, e.g., Daniel Sarmiento, Reform of the General Court: An Exercise in Minimalist 
(but Radical) Institutional Reform, 19 CAMBR. YRBK. OF EUR. LEG. STUD. 236 (2017). 
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the proposal to introduce specialized chambers as part of the 
institutional reform of the EU General Court, the CJEU’s first instance, 
was ultimately rejected.169 However, the discussion about advantages 
of specialized chambers will continue, not least since the CJEU itself 
has changed its position on the issue in the past.170 Even if a specialized 
chamber will not see the light of day, conferring jurisdiction over 
government bondholder disputes to the CJEU would go far in ensuring 
harmonized dispute settlement procedures in cross-border sovereign 
debt disputes that inevitably emanate from debt restructurings—
indeed, the lack of such mechanism was one of the central obstacles to 
establishing an SDRM on the international level.171 
2. Establishing a Sovereign Debt Arbitration Mechanism 
Another potential forum for the settlement of sovereign debt-
related disputes would be an arbitral tribunal. In this respect, the late 
Professor Sandrock argued in favor of a stronger role for international 
arbitration in settlement of sovereign debt disputes against the 
backdrop of the Greek crisis.172 Sandrock essentially argued that 
international arbitration has unjustifiably been dismissed by 
policymakers as a means of dispute resolution when sovereign debt is 
to be restructured.173 Others have, for instance, discussed the potential 
advantages of arbitration in the context of the recent Puerto Rican debt 
restructuring.174 
But how could such arbitration mechanism credibly be designed 
in the context of an ESDRF? First, a specialized arbitral institution for 
sovereign debt disputes could be established at the ICSID, which has a 
 
169.  Id. at 242. 
170.  Id. at 242-34. 
171.  Notably, see Hagan, supra note 116, 385 (noting that “[a]s work on the SDRM 
proposal progressed, it became increasingly clear that, no matter how streamlined its design, 
there would need to be a number of technical rules that it would be inappropriate to specify in 
the treaty itself”). 
172.  See generally Otto Sandrock, The Case for More Arbitration When Sovereign Debt 
is to Be Restructured: Greece as an Example¸ 23 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 507 (2012). 
173.  See id. Others have been less positive and warned that subsuming sovereign bonds 
under the definition of “investment” may incentivize holdout investors to leverage their 
bargaining position by invoking Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) against countries that 
seek to restructure their debts. See, e.g., Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign 
Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 711, 716-17 (2007). 
174.  Melika Hadziomerovic, Note, An Arbitral Solution: A Private Law Alternative to 
Bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, Territories, and Sovereign Nations, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263, 
1285 (2017). 
2019] SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 835 
long-standing history in adjudicating investment-related disputes,175 or 
at least emulate its elaborate rules of procedure.176 For instance, 
arbitrators could be selected from a preconceived list of experts in the 
field, as is the procedure for ICSID arbitration.177 In addition, one may 
consider requiring a panel to consist of arbitrators from the country 
which underwent a debt restructuring, as well as arbitrators whose 
nationality is identical to the claimants’, though this is currently not the 
procedure for arbitration cases before the ICSID. 
A more contentious issue concerns the substantive law which the 
specialized arbitral tribunal would have to apply.178 In this context, 
recent free trade agreements (“FTAs”), such as the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”),179 could serve as a source 
of inspiration, given that they include provisions on sovereign debt 
restructurings. CETA for example protects “negotiated 
restructurings,”180 i.e., restructurings that have been approved by 
seventy-five percent of investors, from arbitration in investor-state 
tribunals. In light of this provision, two conclusions may be drawn. 
First, CETA limits investor-state arbitration to cases where the debt 
exchange did not attract sufficient investor support (referred to as 
“negotiated restructuring”), introducing a “check” on states not to 
 
175.  See, e.g., ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2nd ed. 2018); Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
47 (2009). 
176.  For different views, see Sandrock, supra note 172, at 543; Waibel, supra note 173, at 
728 (rejecting the role of investment arbitration). 
177.  See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment 
Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 486, 447 (2013) (noting that “[i]n his choice of arbitrators, 
the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council is restricted to those people listed in a Panel 
of Arbitrators, which contains names of arbitrators selected by ICSID Contracting Parties and 
by the Chairman”). 
178.  For some a discussion of issues that may arise in this regard, see, e.g., Gregory D. 
Makoff, Simplifying Sovereign Bankruptcy – A Voluntary Single Host Country Approach to 
SDRM Design, CIGI PAPERS NO. 76, Sept. 2015, available at https://www.cigionline.org/
sites/default/files/cigi_paper_76_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YKS-3T5N]. 
179.  Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016 
[hereinafter CETA]. 
180.  According to Annex 8-B CETA, a “negotiated restructuring means the restructuring 
or rescheduling of debt of a Party that has been effected through (a) a modification or amendment 
of debt instruments, as provided for under their terms, including, their governing law, or (b) a 
debt exchange or other similar process in which the holders of no less than seventy-five per cent 
of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt subject to restructuring have consented 
to such debt exchange or other process.” Id. at 332. 
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restructure opportunistically.181 Crucially, the protection of negotiated 
restructurings is independent from the success of a potential CAC vote, 
implying that the state may also resort to other (contractual or statutory) 
measures as long as this is in agreement with a supermajority of 
investors.182 Second, CETA implicitly acknowledges that investor-
state arbitration may be a means to resolve disputes related to sovereign 
debt restructuring where contractual or other mechanisms have 
failed.183 Consequently, under certain conditions, a CETA tribunal 
may—on the basis of the text of CETA—decide whether debt 
restructuring measures have unduly expropriated sovereign debt 
holders. 
While an in-depth review of the merits of sovereign debt 
arbitration would go beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear that 
policymakers have already recognized a potential role for arbitration in 
balancing the investors’ and the states’ interests during economic and 
financial crisis.184 Whether a similar logic could apply to sovereign 
debt restructuring seems worth exploring. 
 
181.  See, e.g., Kei Nakajima, An Elusive Safeguard with Loopholes: Sovereign Debt and 
Its Negotiated Restructuring in International Investment Agreements in the Age of Global 
Financial Crisis, 2016 INT’L REV. L. 1, 20 (2016). 
182.  This conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of Annex X of the CETA, which does 
not refer to the use of CACs but defines “negotiated restructurings” broadly: 
 
“negotiated restructuring” means the restructuring or rescheduling of a debt 
instrument that has been effected through (i) a modification or amendment of such 
debt instrument, as provided for under its terms, or (ii) a comprehensive debt 
exchange or other similar process in which the holders of no less than 75 percent of 
the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt under such debt instrument 
have consented to such debt exchange or other process. 
 
CETA, supra note 179, annex X. 
183.  This follows from the fact that the CETA only excludes “negotiated restructurings” 
from the scope of dispute settlements in Annex X – argumentum e contrario, all other (coercive) 
government debt restructurings can be challenged before a CETA arbitration tribunal. Id. annex 
X. 
184.  For a discussion of the experience with CACs in the euro area and the envisaged 
introduction of single-limb CACs, see Christoph Grosse Steffen, Sebastian Grund & Julia 
Schumacher, Collective Action Clauses in the Euro Area: A Law and Economic Analysis of the 
Airst Five Years, CAP. MKTS. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3318570 [https://perma.cc/G8EM-8KQF]. 
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F. Enhancing the Contractual Framework 
1. Enhancing the Euro CAC 
To make debt restructuring more orderly, the current Euro CAC 
could be revised.185 An enhanced Euro CAC could be modeled on the 
CAC standard developed by the International Capital Market 
Association (“ICMA”) for international sovereign bonds,186 which, 
according to the IMF, is now used in the majority of new bond 
issuances. 187 The key rationale of enhancing the Euro CAC is to ensure 
the success of a debt restructuring by reducing the incentives for 
holdout behavior.188 This does not mean that debt restructuring would 
become more likely but rather that, if the decision to restructure debt is 
taken, the operation can be carried out in a smooth manner.189 The 
different contractual enhancements presented in the following sections 
all cater to this overarching objective. 
a. Introducing aggregation features and a single-limb voting 
procedure 
To align the Euro CAC with the international standard, it would 
have to be equipped with more robust aggregation features designed to 
alleviate holdout inefficiencies.190 The two-limb voting process of the 
current Euro CAC, which requires the debtor to achieve majority 
approval in each individual series and for the aggregate of outstanding 
bonds, would be replaced by a single-limb mechanism.191 As a result, 
 
185.  See infra III.F.1. for an analysis of the Euro CACs’ arguable shortcomings. 
186.  See ICMA, supra note 76. 
187.  See INT’L MON. FUND, supra note 76. 
188.  Mark Sobel, Merits of single-limb CACs, OFFICIAL MONETARY & FIN. INSTITUTIONS 
FORUM, July 10, 2018, available at https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2018/july/
merits-of-single-limb-cacs/ [https://perma.cc/6ZEU-9QLA]. 
189.  The benefits of resorting to CACs to restructure sovereign debt stem from the 
possibility to “cram-down” dissenting minority holdouts. CACs do not mean that the country is 
more likely to default; for an overview, see, e.g., Christian Hofmann, Sovereign-Debt 
Restructuring in Europe under the New Model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT’L L. J. 
385, 444 (2014). 
190.  For the advantages of single-limb CACs over double-limb CACs, see id. at 404 
(noting that “[the Euro CAC] establishes two conditions to be met cumulatively for the 
modification of the debt terms to succeed if the cross-series modification clause is invoked: A 
certain percentage of the accumulated bond debt that is subject to the aggregated vote must 
approve, and, in addition, a certain number of bondholders of each series must accept.”). For 
other design flaws in the Euro CAC, see Giuseppe Bianco, Collective Action Clauses in the 
Eurozone: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 16 EUR. J. L. REFORM 713, 727 (2014). 
191.  See, e.g., DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 14. 
838 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
a proposed bond modification, and hence the restructuring plan, would 
have to be approved by a (super-) majority of seventy-five percent of 
the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding bonds.192 This would 
reduce the likelihood of holdouts acquiring smaller series of sovereign 
bonds with a view at blocking the modification of these series under a 
double-limb voting mechanism. 
Moreover, while the Euro CAC allows for “partial cross-series 
modifications,” aimed at avoiding the blocking of small series, the 
procedure seems overly complex and difficult to use in practice.193 In 
essence, this type of cross-series modification rests on a legal fiction, 
according to which the modification of certain blocked series is deemed 
successful if, within a pre-defined amount of certain other series, the 
required majorities are reached.194 While this provision allows the debt 
restructuring to go ahead, holdouts will still hold the original claim and 
are not bound to the debt restructuring deal.195 The ICMA Model CAC, 
in contrast, does not need such complex legal fictions to resolve 
holdout problems in individual series; it simply binds all dissenting 
bondholders to the proposed modifications.196 With the objectives of 
increasing transparency, decreasing complexity, and ensuring the 
integrity of the CAC voting procedure, it seems warranted to also move 
to a single-limb, fully aggregated CAC standard in the euro area.197 
Indeed, as Sobel has recently noted, “[s]ingle-limb CACs will help 
tackle the hold-out creditor problem and limit ensuing litigation, which 
have often bedeviled restructurings” and “[e]uro area governments 
would be well advised to modernize the CACs in their sovereign bonds 
by including the single-limb feature.”198 
Indeed, if designed properly, an enhanced Euro CAC can 
guarantee a sufficient level of investor protection.199 In the euro area, 
 
192.  See ICMA, supra note 76. For a discussion of the features of the ICMA CAC, see 
Leland Goss, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Made Easy, 32 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 62, 63 (2013). 
193.  See ESDM, supra note 69, art. 2.4. 
194.  See Hofmann, supra note 189, at 404-05. 
195.  For an explanation of this feature, see ALLEN & OVERY, GOVERNMENT BOND 
RESTRUCTURING “MADE IN GERMANY”: THE RISE OF ANTI-HOLDOUT CLAUSES (2012), 
available at http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Government%20bond%20
restructuring.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJQ7-USCB]. 
196.  See ICMA, supra note 76, at 4. 
197.  In support of this suggestion, see, e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al., supra note 27, at 13. 
198.  Sobel, supra note 188. 
199.  Regarding the enforceability of CACs in Europe, cf. Assenagon Asset Management 
SA v. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd [2012] EWHC 2090 (Eng.) (in this decision, the 
High Court of England and Wales concluded that in certain, extreme cases, resolutions passed 
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all countries have ratified the ECHR, which means that the same 
minimum level of protection of property rights applies in the whole 
currency union.200 In this regard, the ECtHR has recently confirmed the 
legality of applying a single-limb CAC with full aggregation features 
in a sovereign debt restructuring inside the euro area.201 Against this 
backdrop, it seems excessive to dismiss the enforceability of CACs on 
constitutional grounds.202 Finally, the Euro CAC could—as does the 
ICMA CAC—leave the issuer the option to either apply a single or a 
double-limb voting mechanism, should there be jurisdiction-specific 
legal constraints with respect to conducting a single vote that applies 
across all series. 
Heeding these calls, euro area finance ministers rendered a 
political declaration of intent at the Eurogroup meeting of December 4, 
2018 “to introduce single limb collective action clauses (CACs) by 
2022 and to include this commitment in the ESM Treaty.”203 This 
political agreement will need to be translated into a legal text in the 
near future.204 
b. Majority voting on bond acceleration 
An enhanced Euro CAC should also restrict the acceleration of 
the bond’s principal payment in the event of default to a predefined 
majority of investors. The ICMA CAC already entails majority voting 
requirements with respect to the acceleration, requiring twenty-five 
percent of bondholders to consent.205 With respect to euro area 
 
by the majority of bondholders to expropriate minority bondholders may be illegal under English 
contract law). 
200.  See Emmert & Carney, supra note 154. 
201.  See Mamatas & Others v. Greece, No. 63066/14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016). 
202.  Indeed, the aggregated CAC retrofitted to local-law bonds in the Greek PSI featured 
a 66.67% threshold for bond modifications to be successful. This means minority investors’ 
rights were affected even more strongly than under the 75% threshold we propose in this paper 
(and which has become the standard for international sovereign bonds). 
203.  Council of the EU, Term Sheet on the European Stability Mechanism Reform (Dec. 
4 2018), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37267/esm-term-sheet-041218_final_
clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/CMZ9-E6QL]. 
204.  For a general analysis of (single-limb) CACs, see Grosse Steffen et al., supra note 
184. 
205.  See ICMA, supra note 76, at Standard Aggregated Collective Action Clauses 
(“CACs”) for the Terms and Conditions of Sovereign Notes 16. The provision states the 
following: 
 
If any of the following events (each an “Event of Default”) occurs and is continuing: 
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government bonds, this threshold could be set even higher, e.g., at fifty 
percent. As a consequence, holdout investors would be discouraged 
from buying distressed debt. This is because holdouts may accelerate a 
bond to demand repayment of interest and principal.206 If acceleration 
becomes subject to approval by a certain number of investors, which is 
the case for most emerging market sovereign bond contracts,207 the 
appeal to engage in such tactics is significantly reduced.208 
The EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets 
(“ESDM”) that negotiated the Euro CAC in 2011 found that such 
provisions may run into serious legal difficulties in some euro area 
Member States, without however further specifying the nature and 
extent of these problems.209 Given that the ICMA acceleration clause 
is deemed consistent with English and New York law, and given that 
these two jurisdictions have a relatively high standard of minority 
creditor and shareholder protection210, there should be few legal 
concerns that acceleration features would infringe national 
constitutional law in the euro area.211 Of course, further analysis may 
be required to confirm this assumption. 
 
then the holders of at least 25 per cent. in aggregate principal amount of the 
outstanding Notes may, by notice in writing to the Issuer (with a copy to the [Fiscal 
Agent/Trustee/other bondholder representative]), declare all the Notes to be 
immediately due and payable, whereupon they shall become immediately due and 
payable at their principal amount together with accrued interest without further action 
or formality. Notice of any such declaration shall promptly be given to all other 
Noteholders by the Issuer. 
 
206.  For the mechanics of acceleration clauses, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric 
A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 
147, 180 (2012). According to the authors, acceleration provisions vary a great deal. Some allow 
individual creditors to accelerate their obligations should an Event of Default occur. Most bonds 
today, however, provide that a vote of twenty-five percent of the bonds is required before 
acceleration can take place. 
207.  Id. at 163. 
208.  Indeed, the holdout creditor could only sue for the (immediate) repayment of coupon 
payments, which is typically dwarfed by the principal amount. Holding out would therefore 
become even more risky and financially unattractive, as the holdout would have to either buy a 
much larger stake in the sovereign’s debt stock or convince other investors to join forces. 
209.  See ESDM, supra note 69, at 7. Contra, Hofmann, supra note 189, at 405-06 
(suggesting that the Euro CAC also features acceleration provisions, which the authors 
could however not confirm when analyzing the legal text of the Euro CAC). 
210.  For an overview, see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer 
& Robert W. Wishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1155 (1998). 
211.  This assumption presents the Authors’ view. Of course, whether acceleration features 
would clear potential constitutional law obstacles in every single Member State would require 
further in-depth research that would go beyond the scope of this Article. 
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c. Majority voting on stays of enforcement 
As proposed by the IMF in 2002 in the context of the SDRM, an 
enhanced Euro CAC could enable a certain pre-defined majority of 
creditors, e.g., twenty-five or fifty percent, to impose a stay on 
enforcement proceedings by individual bondholders.212 Stays are 
ubiquitous in domestic insolvency law in order to prevent a “rush to the 
courthouse” by creditors trying to attach the debtor’s (remaining) 
assets.213 In the sovereign context, a stay on an enforcement action is 
no doubt contentious and should be narrowly circumscribed to mitigate 
any adverse effects on financial transactions, especially those 
pertaining to derivative contracts, most notably credit default swaps 
(“CDS”).214 
At the same time, as the Greek PSI illustrated, even if a country 
opts for a market-friendly approach by retrofitting CACs, CDS are 
likely to be triggered.215 If a majority of creditors decides to impose an 
enforcement moratorium with the objective of facilitating negotiations, 
the biggest threat would stem from the size of the CDS exposures, 
given that they could bankrupt the CDS protection seller.216 Again 
though, as the Greek case implies, the CDS exposures may be 
overestimated, as well as the contagion risks inherent to a default event 
being triggered in one euro area country.217 
 
212.  For the IMF’s proposal, see Hagan, supra note 116, at 363-68. Hagan notes that the 
context of the IMF’s SDRM proposal, the idea of an automatic stay was originally conceived. 
However, it was perceived in the course of the negotiations that an automatic stay would 
constitute an unnecessary and inappropriate shift in legal leverage from creditors to debtors-one 
which, on the margin, could encourage (or be perceived as encouraging) defaults by debtors. Id. 
213.  See generally, Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 175, 268 (1978). 
214.  See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 347, 
377 (2012). 
215.  Id. 
216.  See id., at 350-46. 
217.  For an analysis, see, e.g., Grzegorz Halaj, Tuomas Peltonen & Martin Schleicher, 
How Did the Greek Credit Event Impact the Credit Default Swap Market?, 35 J. FIN. STABILITY 
136, 158 (2018) (finding very little discernible direct impact of the Greek credit event on CDS 
spreads overall, which provides evidence that the credit event was well anticipated by most 
market participants). If anything, the main lesson from the Greek Crisis has been to better 
regulate sovereign CDS. The Greek Crisis could be compared with the EU’s “Short Selling 
Regulation.” For a description of the Short Selling Regulation, see Regulation 236/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects 
of Credit Default Swaps, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1. This Regulation essentially prohibits certain 
speculative transactions with sovereign CDS, referred to as “naked” or “uncovered” short 
selling. Id. 
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In any event, a stay on enforcement, agreed upon by a certain 
majority of investors, could significantly increase the prospect of a 
successful negotiation outcome, for uncooperative investors have little 
incentive to launch asset attachment attempts if their claims are, by 
virtue of contract, not enforceable for a certain limited period of 
time.218 Some lessons may also be learned from the handling of very 
recent cases of sovereign debt distress, notably the case of Puerto 
Rico.219 The law adopted by the US Congress to address Puerto Rico’s 
debt crisis goes even further and imposes an automatic stay on all 
creditor action with the objective of facilitating an orderly debt 
restructuring.220 While Puerto Rico cannot be compared to a euro area 
Member State, given the ambiguous constitutional relationship with the 
United States, the stay serves as an insightful example as to how 
holdout inefficiencies can be ex-ante deterred.221 
 
218.  A rational holdout creditor would weigh her chances to successfully attach sovereign 
assets with costs for pursuing such enforcement attempts. If the enforcement is ex-ante 
restricted, it would not make economic sense for the holdout to launch proceedings. 
219.  For a general overview of the Puerto Rican debt restructuring, see Mitu Gulati & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 91 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 133, at ii (2017). 
220.  For an overview of Puerto Rico’s debt restructuring, see generally Lorraine S. 
McGowen, The Impact of the New Restructuring Law on Puerto Rico Creditors, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 20, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/08/20/the-impact-of-the-new-restructuring-law-on-puerto-rico-creditors 
[https://perma.cc/8L78-W32S] (noting that “the automatic stay operates as a general moratorium 
and court-ordered injunction, and no court order is is necessary as the injunction is automatically 
triggered by the enactment of [Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act 
(“PROMESA”)]. 
221.  More specifically, § 2194 of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act imposes a stay on acts, such as: 
 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
Government of Puerto Rico that was or could have been commenced before the 
enactment of this chapter, or to recover a Liability Claim against the Government of 
Puerto Rico that arose before the enactment of this chapter; 
(2) the enforcement, against the Government of Puerto Rico or against property of the 
Government of Puerto Rico, of a judgment obtained before the enactment of this 
chapter; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the Government of Puerto Rico or of 
property from the Government of Puerto Rico or to exercise control over property of 
the Government of Puerto Rico; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the Government 
of Puerto Rico; 
 
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C.S. § 
2194(a)(1-4). 
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This said, in a monetary union of financially highly developed 
economies, the euro area, subtler and less invasive methods to achieve 
the objective of a stay may be preferable. In this respect, the UK Debt 
Relief Act 2010222 could serve as a blueprint for European lawmakers. 
In essence, this UK law limits the amount recoverable in respect of a 
claim against the sovereign debtor to the level agreed internationally as 
part of a debt relief deal.223 Consequently, holdouts may not force a 
country into paying more than it had paid to the restructured creditors, 
thereby ex-ante reducing the appeal of engaging in speculative 
litigation.224 While the UK Debt Relief Act applies to countries that 
have participated in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) 
initiative, its technique could well be emulated in the ESM Treaty 
framework.225 For instance, one may consider stipulating in the ESM 
Treaty that creditors shall not recover more than the market value of 
their bonds at the time of the restructuring offer being accepted by 
creditors. This would discourage holdout litigation in the euro area. 
2. Immunizing ESM funds from holdout litigation 
In 2013, Buchheit et al. put forward an elegant and 
straightforward proposal to improve the euro area crisis resolution 
mechanism, which would complement the ESDRF advanced herein.226 
In essence, they propose to insert a new provision into the ESM Treaty, 
which immunizes the assets of a euro area country from creditor 
 
For further analysis, see, e.g., Michael Cooley, PROMESA Shields Puerto Rico Behind a 
New Automatic Stay, BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER: GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING & 
INSOLVENCY DEV (July 21, 2016), http://bankruptcycave.com/promesa-shields-puerto-rico-
behind-a-new-automatic-stay/ [https://perma.cc/JL9N-333R]. 
222.  Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010, c. 22, § 3 (UK) [hereinafter UK Debt 
Relief Act]. Note that a similar act has been introduced in Belgium and France too; see Lucas 
Wozny, National Anti-Vulture Funds Legislation: Belgium’s Turn, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
697, 747 (2017). 
223.  For an analysis, see UK Debt Relief Act, supra note 222, § 3. 
224.  Wozny, supra note 222, at 742. 
225.  Of course, one would need to analyze specific constitutional constraints to imposing 
limits on bondholder recovery rights in the nineteen-euro area Member States. However, 
positive signals regarding the legality of such recovery limits come from Belgium, where the 
Constitutional Court has rejected a legal challenge against a law that limits the enforcement of 
sovereign debt in specific circumstances. See Bodo Ellmers & Antonio Gambini, Justice 
prevails at the Belgian Constitutional Court: Vulture law survives challenge by NML Capital, 
Eurodad Newsletter (June 5, 2018), https://eurodad.org/vulture-funds-blog [https://perma.cc/
2GSD-7LRF]. 
226.  Buchheit et al., supra note 104, at 8. A similar proposal has been put forward by 
Bagchi, supra note 136, at 15. 
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attachment if that country was engaged in an ESM-supported 
adjustment program.227 As the authors outline, inserting such a 
provision would ensure that financial support provided by the ESM is 
not diverted to the repayment of existing debt obligations, that 
beneficiary states can deflate the expectations of holdouts to extract 
preferential treatment and that the euro area becomes a safe harbor for 
recipient states to hold assets and conduct their financial affairs during 
times of crisis.228 Such immunization of ESM funds would provide for 
an additional layer of protection, complementing other elements of the 
ESDRF and with the overall goal of minimizing holdout inefficiencies 
and legal uncertainty. Given that the insertion of such a provision 
would simply require an amendment to the ESM Treaty and that there 
are international precedents for using such technique in the context of 
debt restructurings,229 the authors of this Article strongly support the 
proposal. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the debate on 
reforming the EMU. More specifically, it discusses the legal aspects of 
government debt restructurings in the euro area and analyzes how a 
revised framework could make restructurings more orderly, fair, and 
predictable. While several proposals have been advanced in existing 
literature, the legal intricacies associated with such mechanism have 
 
227.  COMM. ON INT’L. ECON. POL’Y AND REFORM, supra note 103, at 40. The Committee 
suggests adding the following Article to the ESM Treaty: 
 
Immunity from judicial process 
1. The assets and revenue streams of an ESM Member receiving stability support 
under this Treaty which are held in, originate from, or pass through the jurisdiction 
of an ESM Member shall not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, 
execution, injunctive relief, or similar forms of judicial process, in connection with a 
claim based on or arising out of a debt instrument that was eligible to participate in a 
restructuring of the debt of the beneficiary ESM Member after the effective date of 
this Treaty. 
2. The immunities provided in the preceding paragraph shall automatically expire 
when all amounts due to the ESM from the beneficiary ESM Member have been 
repaid in full. 
 
Id. at 40. 
228.  Id. at 8-9. 
229.  See Buchheit et al., supra note 104, at 9-10 (noting that the European Union 
immunized Iraqi assets in 2003 in order to facilitate a debt restructuring in Iraq without 
interference by holdout investors). 
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received little to no attention. The idea behind this paper is our 
conviction that the unparalleled degree of legal, political, and economic 
integration between euro area Member States would allow for a more 
progressive approach to enhancing government debt restructuring than 
is currently foreseen at the European or international level. 
A well-designed framework could fulfil several functions. On the 
one hand, it may cater for a more transparent approach to address 
sovereign debt sustainability crises, replacing a regime that is fraught 
with ambiguity that is dangerous rather than constructive. On the other 
hand, it could promote an orderly process and reduce the costs of 
sovereign debt restructuring by shielding sovereigns from disruptive 
legal action whilst ensuring an appropriate degree of protection for 
holders of euro area debt securities. From a technical point of view, 
euro area governments may resort to existing statutory instruments, 
such as the ESM Treaty, or indeed EU law, to mandate the inclusion of 
enhanced contractual clauses in government bonds. Complementing 
these contractual improvements, this Article also discusses two options 
for a dispute settlement mechanism: a specialized chamber at the CJEU 
or an arbitral tribunal. 
One should not fall prey to the illusion that inefficiencies, risks, 
and deadweight losses associated with government debt restructurings 
can be “regulated away.” However, an informed discussion about the 
ways in which the existing framework can be improved seems 
indispensable to ensure a more resilient, transparent, and legitimate 
framework to address sovereign debt crises in the euro area. 
  
846 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:3 
 
